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ABSTRACT
This study researches the varying threats that emanate
from terrorists who carry their activity into the online
arena. It examines several elements of this threat.
First, it explores elements of virtual to virtual attacks.
Second, it looks at threats against critical
infrastructures that can be traced to online sources.
Third, this thesis reports on ways that terrorists are
using information technology such as the Internet for
propaganda and communication purposes. Finally, it
highlights the most crucial ways in which the United States
government has responded to the problem. It concludes with
a few recommendations for best practices for future
engagement with varying aspects of cyberterrorism.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the post-modern era has brought with
it incredibly bounty. Communication, facilitated by
technologies like the Internet, has reached nearly
instantaneous speeds - and this has positively impacted all
sectors of the economy, from health care to banking.
Arguably as a result of this technological mastery, post­
industrial societies like that found in the United States
have been able to elevate their political, social and
economic position in the international community to
unprecedented heights.
But just as communication technology brings promise of
new hope for the present and future, it carries unforeseen
dangers. Accessibility and convenience are easily
exploited by those with nefarious intent. More menacing,
the sacrifice of traditional values and the marginalization
of social sectors that coincide with major societal shifts
create a class of disaffected peoples for whom hope lies
out of reach. Often, the brightest glimmers shine from
extremist rhetoric, the devolution of which often leads to
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fatalist action. Without other avenues of recourse, many
lend a hand to support terrorism.
Terrorism, then, has increasingly become one of the
gravest threats to the modern social order. It is not a
monolithic entity, however. The broader term "terrorism"
generally incorporates a variety of struggles, from
nationalist efforts to millennial, religion-based
ideologies. Furthermore, many terrorist actions are often
confused with simple criminal acts, and distinguishing
between them is often difficult. In order to proceed with
a discussion of terrorism, then, a few definitions are
required. From these, one can derive a working version of
cyberterrorism, which will serve to facilitate the
discussion at hand.
Definitions
Any discussion of terrorism cannot be effective
without an initial definition of terms. Neither the
international scholarly nor law enforcement communities
have ever reached a consensus on a definition of
"terrorism;" instead, agencies and scholarly journals use
the definition that best suits their needs. The United
2
States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example,
defines terrorism as
"...the unlawful use of force or violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
Government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives."1
There are several key components to this definition.
First, it requires that terrorism incorporate force or
violence. Second, both persons and property can be
targeted. Third, the goal of the attack must be to coerce
a government or society to adopt the perpetrator's
political goal. This last component, in particular, is
often the cause of overlap between terrorism and less
threatening but equally potent political activism that
turns violent.
There is no contiguity in definition even among
branches of the U.S.'government. In its 2003 Patterns of
Global Terrorism report, the U.S. State Department employs
the following definition, taken from Section 2656f(d) of
Title 22 of United States Code:
The term terrorism means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to 
influence an audience.2
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The primary difference between the State Department's
definition and the FBI's rests in the classification of the
actual attackers. Other agencies, like the U.S. Department 
of Defense, expand terrorism to include threats.3 Academia 
suffers the same problem, with a wide range of definitions
obscuring any resolution or compromise. In 2003, Ayla
Schbley attempted to resolve this debate with a rather
simple definition. Terrorism, in Schbley's view, is simply
"any violent act upon symbolic civilians and their
properties."4
Such a definition may in fact be too simple, since it
avoids many of the specifics that delineate terrorism from
regular crime - most notably the political motivations
behind the actions. So instead of attempting to reach a
clearly articulated definition, this paper merely
incorporates the components above into a loose meaning.
Terrorism, then, is motivated by political change, is often
attributed to non-state actors, and involves violence
against an individual, society, or property.
According to Mark Juergensmeyer, millennial terrorism,
such as the world is facing from groups like al-Qaeda,
seeks attacks that will result in the most destruction, 
thereby creating the most press for them and their cause.5 A
4
"computer bomb" is not as photogenic as its dynamite based
counterpart. Computer based attacks are often not readily
noticeable; when they are, their complicated nature often
does not allow for newspaper-selling headlines.
Since it does not generate media coverage, there is an
implication that cyberterrorism is not a viable means of
attack for terrorists. First, it often is hard to classify
as violence. Even when targeted against critical
infrastructure, it often does not cause death. As Chapter
Three will show, only one cyber-based attack has caused
widespread damage. Second, and more important, many other
areas of cyberterrorism may remain in the area of activity
that seems innocuous. For example, defacing a website is,
in many ways, akin to little more than graffiti on a
highway overpass. It is often expressive, but is usually
cleaned up so quickly that it has little to no impact.
But perhaps this is ignoring a more important issue:
the intent of known terrorists. Two tapes released by Al
Qaeda in 2002 - one featuring leader Osama bin Laden, the
other his right-hand man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri - called upon 
their troops to attack Western economic targets.6 Although 
consistent with Al Qaeda's grand strategy,1 this represents
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a shift in tactics. Cyberspace provides a unique avenue
for just such an attack, or the planning thereof.
One of the most prevalent definitions offered for
cyberterrorism comes from Pollitt:
"...cyber terrorism is the premeditated, 
politically motivated attack against information, 
computer systems, and data which result in 
violence against noncombatant targets by sub 
national groups and clandestine agents."8
This definition, like many others, only includes attacks.
It therefore excludes those who may be preparing for an
attack - a requirement for several techniques, including
Denial of Service. Journalist Ann McFeatters addresses
this issue in a limited manner, claiming that
cyberterrorism is "...the intentional use of the computer
to cause panic by destabilizing the U.S. economy or playing 
havoc with computer data systems."9 This definition, at 
least, allows for vagueness - an important factor in a
situation that constantly evolves.
A loose definition seems appropriate here as well. In
this text, cyberterrorism generally incorporates online
activity that seeks to promote the political causes or
ideology of conventional terrorism. Individuals or groups
perpetrating these activities can be linked to terrorist
groups, but they are often merely sympathizers.
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Cyberterrorist activities as classified range from
propaganda to devastating attacks on critical
infrastructure; restricting the phenomenon to just a few
tactics, however, neglects its ability to take on new
forms. At the same time, however, a loose definition such
as this allows the lines between terrorism and other, more
legitimate forms of speech to blur more easily. This must
be taken into account whenever an action is deemed
terrorism.
A few other definitions are important. Hacktivism is 
hacking in the name of an activist cause.10 Hacktivism can 
be found in the examples of the Zapatista movement in 
Mexico11 and the online Hacktivismo community.12 Netwar is 
an organizational structure in which the interconnectivity 
of modern technology allows for less hierarchy.13 Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks are the attempt to neutralize a
network by flooding it with unnecessary information.
Further definitions can be found in Appendix A.
Literature Review
Scholarly attention to the problems of cyberterrorism
has been unnecessarily limited. Many of the books and
articles produced have come from a few prominent computer
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scientists, although a limited number of political
scientists have addressed the issue as well. Usually,
though, terrorist experts address cyberterrorism in
passing, as an emerging threat that needs to be addressed.
In many ways, this is a result of the youth of the threat
itself; computers and the Internet have only become
ubiquitous components in Western society in recent years.
By neglecting this threat, however, terrorism scholars have
allowed industry and media sources to set the tone.
Consequently, any cyberterrorism study has to answer to the
sensationalism raised by the media or security experts,
each of which stands to profit from increased attention to
the issue and could therefore be less than scrupulous in
their comments and predictions. This study attempts to
overcome this scholarly deficiency and fill that gap.
Before delving into the specifics of the texts that
are available, though, a few statistics are required to
illustrate just how little research is available. In late
April 2004, a study conducted against prominent scholarly
article databases found an incredibly low number of
articles dealing with cyberterrorism; similar queries of 
media sources returned completely opposite results.
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The first study was conducted on EbscoHost, a 
repository of over 3,500 peer-reviewed academic journals.14 
A search for "cyberterrorism" on this database reported 18
hits - but many of these are from the same journal issue.
Five articles were printed in American Behavioral
Scientist's February 2002 issue, which was dedicated solely
to cyberterrorism. Likewise, several articles produced by
this search came from the July 2002 issue of the
Information Management Journal; however, these articles
were all relatively short, (one to two pages), and so they
were not of substantial length to provide a serious and in- 
depth study.15 A similar search of academic database search 
engine WilsonWeb produced only fifteen hits, whereas a 
competitor, JStor, returned zero results.16 Opposingly,
news and media databases were rich with content. The same
search on LexisNexis, a news database, only allows 125
results at a time; in this case, it maxed this allotment 
out.17 Factiva, a similar system, has no such limitations 
on its searches. It found 1,236 articles on cyberterrorism 
in the two years from April 2002 to April 2004.18
This problem is not limited to journals, however;
standard terrorism or national security books fared little
better. A survey of 25 contemporary works on terrorist
9
found that only five books listed cyberterrorism in their
index - and the most any of them dedicated to the topic was 
six pages.19 Similarly, Jonathon White's beginner's guide 
to terrorism only spent seven paragraphs on the issue.20
Obviously, little has been done in the scholarly
community to ensure that the issue of cyberterrorism has
been properly addressed. That does not mean, however, that
there are no articles. The few that do exist provide a
foundation, however weak, upon which this study has been
built.
These articles and books can generally be classified
into just a few categories. Many, like James Ballard, et 
al's "Technological Facilitation of Terrorism,"21 are aimed 
at providing a comprehensive survey of the topic. Some use
this general survey approach as a means to address a
specific facet of the problem. Michael Whine's "Cyberspace
- A new Medium for Communication, Command and Control by 
Extremists"22 uses this approach to describe the 
communications component of cyberterrorism. This works
both ways: Gary Bunt uses cyberterrorism to explore Islam's 
presence online.23
Other issues are more specific. For Dorothy Denning 
and her peers, the free speech and civil rights abuses that
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can result from cyberterrorist crackdowns on non­
cyberterrorists has caused her to pen several articles on
the difference between hacktivism, hackers, and
cyberterrorism.24 The broader umbrella of information 
warfare is also used to address cyberterrorist issues,
although information warfare often is used in the context 
of state military use against a foe.25 Networks and Netwars 
approaches cyberterrorism as symbolic of an emerging 
organizational structure.26
As a result of this relatively slim selection,
articles on cyberterrorism and the media have become
common. Many reviewed found the media to be
misrepresentative of the problem.27 Finally, Yonah
Alexander and Michael Swetnam present an important edited
work that incorporates essays on cyberterrorism from
private industry, government officials, and legal and
academic scholars.28
Statement of the Problem
A modern terrorism text, like Rohan Gunaratna's Inside
Al Qaeda, addresses nearly every aspect of the threat. In
his comprehensive research on the organization, Gunaratna 
explores issues of their organization, structure, ideology,
11
dispersion across the globe, strategy, mindset, and
resulting threat and requisite response.29 When addressing 
any of the dozens of terrorist groups that have emerged in
the modern era, Walter Laqueur explores their motivations, 
history, and actions.30 If this kind of attention is given 
to conventional terrorism, then the same should be afforded
to its online counterpart.
Too often, the debate over the threat of
cyberterrorism revolves around critical infrastructure. As
shown in Chapter Three, the question often seems to come
down to the effect of a cyberterrorist attack - if there is
a potential for death or destruction, it can count as 
terrorism, if not, then the attack is something lesser.31 
Yet if Western society is to truly understand
cyberterrorism, it must address all its forms, activities,
purposes, motivations, history and actors. Neither the
journalistic nor scholarly literature adequately does so.
Because of this, mass media and culture are allowed to
set the tone of the social discussion on cyberterrorism.
This often leads to sensationalistic documents like Winn
Schwartau's Pearl Harbor Dot Com. In this novel, the U.S.
is attacked by a wide, concerted electronic attack by 
unknown sources.32 In 1991, Schwartau achieved limited
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notoriety by using the phrase "Electronic Pearl Harbor" to
describe the threat to cyberspace during testimony to the 
House Committee on Science, Space and Technology.33 
Similarly, an otherwise informative book on cyberterrorism
opened with an unlikely scenario in which cyberterrorists
cooperated with conventional terrorists to shut down a
large regional power grid, give the wrong medicine to
patients in hospitals, and otherwise cause havoc on
society.
Such sensationalism is damaging to a debate on
cyberterrorism for two reasons. First, it incites fear
into those who are unable or unwilling to look into the
situation more thoroughly. This can lead to unnecessarily
abusive legislation passed in the name of protection and
the general closure of social openness vis-a-vis the
Internet. Second, this dialectic turns many who would
otherwise be worthy contributors to the debate away from
it. It then becomes dominated by whomever can make the
most fear-inspiring claims. Academia has a responsibility
to ensure this trend does not continue.t~
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Purpose of the Study-
Given the statement of the problem, the purpose of
this study is to provide a straightforward and
comprehensive survey of the threat posed by this
phenomenon. It recognizes that while a study of
cyberterrorism must not ignore motivations like ideology,
it is more critical to develop an analysis of the threats
posed by cyberterrorism. This paper seeks to answer the
deficiencies of previous research, especially in
formulating a holistic theoretical approach to
cyberterrorism, and provide the analysis to do so. By so
doing, this thesis will, advance the scholarly debate, which
inevitably impacts the law enforcement community.
Theoretical Basis and Organization
Since they are often designed to address a specific
aspect of cyberterrorism, many of the past studies have
been light on broad theory. They are often designed to
address a specific aspect of cyberterrorism. Franpois
Debrix, for example, explores the interactions between
cyberterrorism and the mass media.35 David Ronfeldt and 
John Arquilla use cyberterrorism as an example of their 
netwar theory.36
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Few works try to establish a model with which to
analyze cyberterrorism. The closest appears in Bunt's
Islam in the Digital Age. In this text, the author looks
at Islamic-based cyberterrorism from four viewpoints: the
theological support for online jihad, or "e-jihad;" varying
examples of hacking, cracking and hacktivist activities on
the Internet; extremist Islamic rhetoric on the Internet
after 9/11; and the association of the Palestinian/Israeli
conflict with online Islamic activity.37
His analytical model provides several important
points. First, it looks at ideological justifications for
the activity. Following this, the book provides examples
that illustrate exactly what activity is being highlighted.
Finally, it extends this illustration into the real world
by providing the context of two major and polarizing
battles: the 9/11 attacks and the Palestinian Intifada. In
this manner, he has conceptualized the problem, described
its various implementations and actors, and provided
evidence of the correlation between the activity and the
real-world events that motivate the attackers.
While Bunt's model is helpful, it does not necessarily
apply to the expanse of threats contained in
cyberterrorism. But this is because Bunt's text focuses on
15
Islam, on the Internet, not cyberterrorism. A
cyberterrorism paper would have to restructure Bunt's model
in order to be effective.
This thesis does just that. First, it must remove the
aspects of Bunt's models that are too specific to an
examination of the Islamic Internet. Those, of course, are
the in-depth explorations of ideology and real-world
linkage. If cyberterrorism is a real and long-lasting
threat, it will not be limited to a specific ideology set
or sequence of events. Nonetheless, these facets of
cyberterrorism, which essentially provide the individual or
group's motivations, cannot be completely neglected.
Instead, they must remain central to the analysis of a
specific individual or group.
Stripping out the causes will also allow for a more
careful analysis of the threat. To this end, this paper
posits that there are four main threats or activities that
could constitute or support cyberterrorism. Their
classification tends to rely on the means of action.
First, and most evident, cyberterrorism can occur in
the form of a virtual attack upon other virtual objects.
This primarily includes flooding and denial of service
attacks, but it can also incorporate web site defacements
16
and computer intrusions. Next in progression are virtual
attacks on real world institutions, most notably critical
infrastructures like electricity, water, and transportation
systems.
The last form of attack, which lies more within the
bounds of traditional terrorism, is the physical targeting
- that is, a bomb - of infrastructures critical to the
functioning of Internet systems. This paper does not
address this topic, however. First, the physical nature of
these attacks makes it difficult to distinguish them from
conventional attacks against other critical infrastructure
systems. As such, this threat has been recognized before
in the literature on terrorism; some have even dubbed it 
"technoterrorism."38 Second, the Internet was designed to be 
resilient against attacks; traffic is automatically re­
routed when traffic congestion occurs as a result of a
real-world emergency. Although this strategy was tested by
the attacks on the World Trade Center and shown to be a
threat, the attack, which destroyed a major Internet
switching station, did not permanently knock out Internet
service. For these reasons, this paper leaves this issue
to future research.
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The final and most important element of cyberterrorism
is the use of the Internet for information gathering and
communication. Obviously, this does not constitute a
direct attack. Often, this aspect is limited to the spread
of propaganda or as a collection site for individuals
supporting terrorist or cyberterrorist causes.
Nevertheless, these are important aspects to any terrorist
campaign, whether conventional or virtual.
The following chapters address these issues through
this model. Chapter Two explores the possibilities and
challenges of virtual-to-virtual attacks; Chapter Three
similarly addresses attacks on real world critical
infrastructure. Chapter Four examines the ways in which
the Internet can be used as an information-sharing and
communication device. Chapter Five describes the U.S.
government's reactions to the cyberterrorist threat.
Finally, Chapter Six offers a summary of the arguments
presented herein and prescriptions for the future.
Methodology
Most research for this thesis was undertaken in a
standard manner, and drawn from familiar academic
resources. Unfortunately, the dearth of texts on
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cyberterrorism (discussed in the Literature Review section
of this chapter), along with the delay for new texts to be
published, has forced the author to look to other avenues
for research. News sources figure prominently into this,
as does primary research from websites. These are
generally not taken as fact, but instead as an example of
rhetoric or activities taken.
Much of this research has been conducted over the
previous two years. During this time, however, many
websites used as primary sources were taken offline, moved,
or were otherwise unreachable. This included, especially,
extremist Islamic or terrorist-linked websites like
Azzam.com. Since they were unreachable, verifying their
existence and their contents for this study threatened to
undermine it.
Fortunately, there are several services that archive
webpages. Archive.org continuously scans the Internet for
site changes. If the page encountered does not match the
page they have previously saved, Archive.org saves a new
copy of the website. All saved copies are then available
for later review through their "Internet Archive Wayback
Machine." The objective of this project is to ensure that
19
the Internet's contents to not fall off the web as sites
change.39
Unfortunately, the Archive is not always reliable.
The servers often respond slowly or not at all. In these
instances, the researcher can turn to Google.com.. In its
efforts to quickly search the web, it saves the most recent
copy of each website it visits. Unless the site's owners
have asked Google to limit access to this copy, which 
Google calls the cached copy, users can view it.40 This has 
become a useful way to view the contents of a website that
has recently gone offline.
Several avenues were taken to find these websites.
Azzam.com was found through a 2002 USA Today news story by 
Jack Kelley.41 Many were found via the database housed at 
Internet Haganah.42 Since this lists not just the website 
address, but its unique identifier and contact information
as well, it provides ready information for finding these
websites when they move. The primary tool for this is
whois, which allows the user to search for detailed
information for each website, including contact and
technical information. Internet Haganah uses similar
techniques. Finally, some sites were initially found by
searching.for the online presence of terrorist groups found
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in the literature. Al-Mujahiroun's website was located in
this manner.
Although the research for this project was primarily-
conducted over the past two years, much of the background
knowledge required for its understanding is much older. In
fact, the author has been active, often in a passive way,
in online communities for at least the past fifteen years.
Additionally, the author's conceptions of computer systems
were cemented in 2002 when he received a Bachelor of
Science in Computer Science. Consequently, many parts of
this thesis, like the description of varying attack
techniques, were written from his understanding of the
situation and the technologies involved.
This paper was written, however, not for the computer
scientist but for the political scientist or policymaker.
Therefore, except where noted, much of the technical
information was summarized and explained in simple, non­
computer terms. When trying to explain these sections, the
author attempted to find academic sources that either
supported his definitions or expanded upon them. Most of
these were acquired through the Association for Computer 
Machinery (ACM)'s Digital Library.43 To assist those not
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familiar with computer and terrorism jargon, the author
included a definition of terms as Appendix A.
In essence, much of this paper was arrived at through
standard research techniques - exhaustive reviews of the
scholarly books and journals in university library
holdings, online databases like EBSCOHost and Lexis-Nexis,
and similar online sources. The only exceptions were
listed above.
Limitations of the Study
Obviously, the absence of substantial previous
research presents a challenge'to this study. At the same
time, though, it offers an opportunity for this study to
explore issues that may otherwise be ignored. Instead, the
largest limitation for this survey is its lack of primary
research. This deficiency is especially poignant in its
lack of research on the uniqueness of an individual or
group of cyberterrorists. However, the author has no links
to such individuals, and no way to establish them, so that
research will have to be left to future studies. This is
further stymied by the author's limited language skills,
which exclude the possibility of primary research from non-
English sources, particularly Arabic websites.
22
CHAPTER TWO
VIRTUAL-TO-VIRTUAL ATTACKS
Of the three forms of attack referred to above,
virtual attacks on virtual targets are the most prevalent.
Due to the technical nature of these attacks, however, they
often do not garner the level of press coverage that more
traditional attacks can - like the physical attacks on
critical infrastructure mentioned in the Introduction. At
the same time, though, they are often easier to conduct
than more extensive attacks, like virtual attacks against
the same critical infrastructures (Chapter Three). Virtual
attacks, then, should be distinguished as attacks through
the Internet (or a similar system) upon attacks that have
no real-world salience.
This compendium of attacks is by no means intended to
be all-inclusive. One of the great failings of counter
cyberterrorism efforts is that there is no such compendium.
But to try to make up for this deficiency in this volume
would unnecessarily add to its length and detract from its
message. The examples contained within this chapter, then,
are included simply to show the wide range of the threat.
In the following pages, the reader will find three main
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forms of attack under discussion: flooding or denial of
service attacks (which can be categorized together), worms
and viruses, and web site defacements. These were chosen
as the simplest and most common examples.
Flooding and Denial of Service Attacks
The first recorded cyberterrorism attack was
perpetrated by sympathizers of Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers 
terrorist organization.44 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
EElam (LTTE), colloquially known as the Tamil Tigers, are a
nationalist terrorist organization that has been fighting
for the independence of ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka via
various means - from guerilla warfare to suicide bombing - 
since 1970.45 In this instance, a splinter group that 
called itself the Internet Black Tigers (the Black Tigers
are the commando branch of the LTTE) attacked Sri Lankan
embassies with a flood of e-mails. Sent at a rate of about
800 per day for two weeks, the e-mails read, "We are the
Internet Black Tigers and we're doing this to disrupt your
communications."46 The continuous stream of e-mails choked
the bandwidth to and from e-mail servers, essentially
causing them to shut down. Until they crashed, though,
worker's e-mail inboxes were filled with the unwanted
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messages, thereby obscuring their ability to recognize more
genuine communications.
This e-mail based attack did little damage. Its
effects were relatively concentrated, applying only to Sri
Lankan government officials and those trying to communicate
with them. Although it did cause certain Sri Lankan
government servers to shut down temporarily, the headache
was limited mostly to those in the computer support
services section of the Sri Lankan government.
That does not mean, however, that it had no effect.
Governments all across the world noticed the unique nature
of the activity, and assumed that it was a sign of an
emerging trend. In the United States, for example, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet notified
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in June, 1998,
that such attacks could be replicated by terrorist or
conventional foes against the United States, specifically 
naming Iran, Iraq and Libya as potential attack sources.47
The threat becomes more obvious and more worrisome
when one recognizes that these tactics are not limited
simply to attacks on e-mail servers. Although usually not
sparked by political motives, there is considerable
precedent of this activity. One of the most attention
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grabbing of these was a 2000 Distributed Denial of Service
(DoS) against numerous high-profile websites, including
internet web portal Yahoo.com.
On February 7, 2000, Yahoo's servers experienced an
overwhelming number of requests emanating from sources
across the Internet. From 10:30 am Pacific Standard Time
(PST) to 1:00 pm PST, when activity was at its highest,
Yahoo's website received more than 1 gigabit of information
per second, an overwhelming number for their Internet
Service Provider. The Yahoo website was quickly forced
offline until the company was able to move to a backup 
location.48 The next day, CNN.com, a major news source, 
experienced a similar attack; Dell.com, Amazon.com, 
eBay.com and several others were also shut down.49
Denial of Service attacks such as these, which
essentially overwhelm the service provider such that they
are unable to continue providing service, are relatively
simple to orchestrate. In a typical attack scheme, the
attacker first hacks into several computers across the
Internet and installs "agent" software. The more computers
that the hacker can break into at this stage, the better;
they provide the soldiers in his or her digital army. Once
satisfied, the hacker breaks into a few other computers and
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installs "handler" software. These computers directly
control the agents, allowing the hacker to remain a step
removed from the process. Once the hacker gives the
handler computers a few commands, generally little more
than the target address, the handler directs the agent
computers in the attack. Each agent then routinely sends a
series of (usually invalid) requests to the target server,
though not enough that they will squelch the bandwidth of
the agent or seem unusual to a casual observer. The target
computer, following protocol, responds with a simple
message saying that the message was received, thereby
doubling the amount of bandwidth used by the target
machine. Such exchanges are fairly common, however, so it
is only when several agents coordinate their requests that 
they have a noticeable impact on the target.50
As such, it is often difficult for the owner of an
agent computer to detect an attack, especially in a large
network. Furthermore, determining the individual or group
behind the attack, which is obviously important for law
enforcement purposes, provides even more challenges. Most
detection methods involve various means of traffic
monitoring, although alternative traceback methods are 
often used to determine the hacker's identity.51 Other
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detection methods include "sniffers," which detect
suspicious activity on vulnerable computers, and processing 
and network analysis tools that pinpoint load anomalies.52
The February 2000 attacks against CNN, Yahoo and
others were perpetrated by a Canadian teenage hacker known 
as "Maf iaboy. "53 Mafiaboy was not driven by any political 
motivation, so his attacks cannot be classified as
cyberterrorism. But there are many other reasons for
including them in this compendium. First, Mafiaboy's youth
provides important demographic information. In a similar
attack, for example, an autistic British teenager crashed
the servers of the Port of Houston through a DoS attack,
effectively halting shipping until the systems were
restored.54
Second, Mafiaboy's attacks were relatively
unsophisticated, facilitated by tools easily accessible on 
many hacking sites.55 Third, the effects of the attacks, 
although minimal (Yahoo, for example, was online later the 
same day),56 were limited by the technical resources of the 
companies attacked. Potential cyberterrorists can employ
similar attack means and methods, but their targets are not
always so prominent.
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One such example is the dual October 2003 DoS attacks
against the independent Internet Haganah organization.
Internet Haganah attempts "to make the Internet an
unfriendly environment for jihadists [sic]," according to 
its owner, Aaron Weisburd.57 Mr. Weisburd targets websites
that he deems are connected to Islamic-based terrorist
organizations. After gathering information on the owner of
the website and the company providing them with hosting
space(known as their hosting company), Weisburd publicly
pressures the hosting company to remove the questionable
content.58 Weisburd claims that he has shut down 42 0
websites in this manner.59
These efforts eventually resulted in blowback,
however. On October 16, 2003, and then again on October
20, 2003, Internet Haganah was the subject of a DoS attack
that succeeded in knocking the website offline. In so
doing, the attackers effectively shut down Internet
Haganah's hosting company, Hosting Matters. The first 
attack left Hosting Matters offline for nearly a full day,60 
taking a number of prominent politically oriented websites,
message boards, and weblogs offline at the same time.
Commentators at some of the websites affected found message
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board discussions in Arabic and English alluding to further 
DoS attacks on the organization.61
This was not an isolated incident. In March, 2004,
the website for the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, a secular
Palestinian nationalist group, reportedly called for a DoS
attack on the El Al Airlines website. The message offered 
training for anyone wishing to participate in the assault.62 
Similar energy has been directed toward Internet attacks by
pro-Pakistani, pro-Palestinian, and many other groups.
These attacks have accelerated since the outbreak of the
Second Intifada in 2000, and, at least in the case of the
Israel-Palestine conflict, have been led by hackers from
both sides.63 Each side has.used several means of attack 
uring that time:
"The most common weapons used were variations on 
denial-of-service and 'ping-flood' type tools 
with nefarious names like 'EvilPing,' and 
'QuickFire.' EvilPing... can completely crash 
most machines... Once one side distributes an 
attack tool, that same tool is then reconfigured 
and used against the [attacker]."64
The prevalence of such attacks is facilitated by a
variety of easy to use tools, EvilPing and QuickFire just
being two examples. Evilping is an older tool that lacks
sophistication. Some of the newest software, like
'Phatbot,' offers the user an almost completely automated
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DoS experience through the exploitation of advanced peer to 
peer networking technology.65 Furthermore, these tools are 
readily available, both on sites dedicated to hacking and
those dedicated to security. They often come complete with
instruction sets on use. Hackerworld, for example,
promises to teach the reader, "step by step, keystroke by 
keystroke... exactly how us Hackers work our magic."66 
Internet website 7hg reportedly combined hacking
information with extremist rhetoric, although its contents
could not be confirmed.67
Symptoms similar to those produced by such DoS
activity are often not directly connected to any particular
hacker or terrorist attacks. Instead, they are often
little more than a by-product of events in the real world.
During the morning of September 11, 2001, for example, news
websites such as CNN.com and the Baltimore Sun were so
overwhelmed with legitimate traffic that they were unable
to serve all requests. Even more innocent, interest in
National Security Agency (NSA) computer security guides 
posted online crashed the NSA computers hosting them. 68 
This phenomenon has been dubbed "slashdotting" or the
"Slashdot effect" after a popular internet news site whose 
users unwittingly cause server meltdowns.69
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Both instances are side effects of legitimate use.
Consequently, they point to flaws in the implementation of
current infrastructure schemes that can be easily exploited
- namely, that the phenomenon of increased public interest
in an event serves only to stifle the ability to
disseminate information about the news story. Left in the
dark, users tend to try to find information via any means
possible, thereby unwittingly widening the malaise. It
would be unsurprising if would-be terrorists coordinated
any real-world terrorist attacks to coincide with similar
cyberterrorist efforts. When aimed at news sources or
government agencies, these efforts could become a force
multiplier of the original attack.
Worms and Viruses
On November 2, 1988, the fledgling Internet slowed to
a crawl. Three to ten percent of the computers online at
the time found their Internet connections disconnected as
the Internet's first major worm spread throughout the
network. Though the number of infected computers was low
(about 2,000-6,000), the incident remains, proportionally,
the largest and most effective attack on the global network 
since its inception.70 Nonetheless, the worm was written to
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be totally innocuous: the author, an MIT graduate student
named Robert Morris, merely desired to show the flaws in 
sendmail, a popular mail program.71 Both the systems the 
worm exploited and the resulting chaos and damage that
ensued foreshadowed later attacks.
While Morris's early worm was the most widespread, the
mantle of most damaging politically oriented malicious
software (malware) goes to the CodeRed series of worms. 
Released on July 19, 2001,72 the worm first propagated 
throughout the Internet by connecting to a randomly
generated set of computers and attempting to exploit a flaw
in the Windows operating system. This behavior continued 
from the 1st of the month until midnight on the 19th day of
the month, after which the worm launched a concerted DoS
attack on the U.S. White House website. The worm was
programmed to renew this cycle at the beginning of each 
month.73 In the process of shutting down the White House 
website, the worm replaced the website of every 100th 
Microsoft Windows NT server with a simple message that 
stated that the machine had been "Hacked by Chinese."74 By 
the time the worm was contained, it had caused USD$2.62 
billion in damage.75
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Worms and viruses are a relatively similar phenomenon.
Both are designed to seize control of some aspect of a
computer's functionality. Most, although not all, viruses
and worms have a malicious motivation, and often delete
files, corrupt the machine's operating system into an
unworking state, install a 'backdoor' to allow future 
access, or otherwise wreak havoc on the system.75 Viruses 
and worms differ from each other in that worms are designed
to be more automated, relying less on human input than
viruses. They therefore tend to spread rapidly throughout 
a network.77 Viruses, on the other hand., usually are 
attached to a host program, and can only infect a computer 
when the host program is run.78 Additionally, many worms, 
like the most recent Netsky variant,79 initiate DoS attacks 
after infection. In many ways, therefore, worms represent
the greater threat.
Some of the most common worms of recent years have
spread through e-mail programs, wherein an effected machine
sends copies of the worm as e-mail attachments to everyone
in the user's address book. Others, like Code Red or the
more recent Slammer worm, which attacked both computers and
ATM machines and had infected the majority of vulnerable
machines in just ten minutes, take advantage of software
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bugs.80 Many worms and viruses, including Code Red, exploit 
vulnerabilities reported in computer security media. 81 
Makers of the effected software often release a patch to
update the software before a malicious program can take
advantage of the vulnerability; in these instances, worms
spread by infecting machines whose owners have not updated
their software accordingly.
Both worms and viruses are often replicated,
reconfigured, and re-released. The first instance of
CodeRed, for example, had a bug that limited the damage it
could cause. Subsequent versions changed the intent of the
program, targeting different sites for DoS attacks or doing
something else entirely. CodeRed II, itself a variant, has
been re-released in six different versions.82 The worm
spreading through the Internet at time of writing, Netsky,
had 2 6 variants.83
Often, the new variant of the virus is not authored by
the original programmer. Instead, others download the
source code or otherwise copy the innovation to create
their own variation of the malware. This applies to
hackers connected to terrorist organizations just as
equally as it does to less politically motivated hackers.
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In fact, this phenomenon has popped up with relative
frequency in cyberterrorist circles. The Muslim Hackers
Club, which espouses pro-Palestinian and Pakistani
rhetoric, offers tutorials for would-be hackers on writing 
new viruses or adapting old ones.84 Additionally, a variant 
of the Toal virus that appeared in October 2001 (at the
beginning of the Afghanistan conflict) sends the infected
computer a randomly selected message. Users with an
infected computer who open the e-mail that carries the
virus are greeted with messages as varied as "Usa against
geneva convention [sic]," "Is osama bin laden bad-loved ? 
[sic]," and "Anthrax mail is true(not a joke) [sic]."85 The 
attachment, when run, distorts the screen image and pops a 
similar anti-American message onto the screen.86 Similarly, 
the Nedal virus, though relatively harmless, was so named
by the virus author because it is "Laden" spelled
backwards. Nedal.a, a more effective variant, overwrites
popular file formats, including music and video files and
documents, and deletes all files on the computer on 11 
September each year.87
In the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq, the reputed
author of the Nedal virus, a Malaysian hacker known as
Melhacker, threatened to "attack or launch [a] worm if
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America attacks Iraq."88 The worm he claimed to be ready to 
release - early versions of which had reportedly already
appeared on the Internet - was a combination of several
earlier viruses and worms, including some attributed to the
same hacker.89
Although no subsequent worm was attributed to this
threat, it raised concerns over the phenomenon of viruses
as a cyberterrorism tool. Through an accomplice, Melhacker 
reportedly had ties to A.Q.T.E. Al Qaeda network,90 although 
that group's actual ties to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
are unknown, and presumed to be non-existent.91 Moreover, 
several other viruses and worms emerged as. a result of the
Iraq War. The Ganda, Lisa and Wanor worms, which all
appeared near the beginning of the war, urged the infected 
against the conflict.92 Accordingly, concerns over rising 
pro-terrorist viral activity continue.
Web Site Defacement
Web site defacements are the most common, closest to
traditional hacking in method and means, and, in many ways,
the least threatening of the potentially cyberterrorist
activities addressed in this chapter. Many consider them
to be nothing more than an annoyance that leaves little
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long-lasting effect. Regardless, they can be used by
cyberterrorists to limit the availability or content of
important information sources.
Defacements are usually relatively straightforward.
The potential hacker tunnels his or her way into a website
through any of a number of exploits and methods. Some use
security holes in software or their configuration; others
use social engineering - the process of convincing a target
to unknowingly give up sensitive information about their 
website93 - to gain access. Once inside, the malicious 
explorer replaces the website's content with their own.
In most cases, the new content holds little
information - usually just the hacker's name, group
affiliation, and 'shout-outs' to friends and colleagues.
Most individuals or groups that engage in these activities
target local sites. Accordingly, Ion, a prominent
Brazilian group, targets mostly Brazilian sites;94 the 
Italian group IR4Dex leaves their signature primarily on 
Italian sites.95 Both these groups rank in the Top 10 
attackers tracked by defacement monitoring website Zone- 
H.org.95
Many are less innocent, however. Unix Security Guards
(USG), a pro-Muslim hacking group that has performed 5069
38
defacements, has emerged as a leader in the anti-American 
web site defacement trend.97 The night after the start of 
the war in Iraq, the group left hundreds of websites marred 
with their own text.98 The text of a typical USG defacement 
condemned the target, the United States, Israel, or any
group or individual deemed an enemy of Islam. The
following is the text of the defacement of copts.org on 8
April 2004. Copts.org is a website designed to promote
awareness of abuses perpetrated by the Egyptian government
against its Coptic minority:
"well., that was for the shit u post in your 
sites/forums/chatting rooms .. ur whole machine 
is mine now... u punch of morons, u fucked 
now..ha !?.
copts of usa/canada are punsh of real loosers, 
all what u say about the persecutions in egypt is 
bullshit , the same thing about the alleged 
kidnapping of your girls , insulting islam all 
over your websites doesn't help your case , its 
just help us to learn how lame you are ,and how 
gay is your demands... get the backup disks 
readfy,coz u gonna have a long night lamers .. i 
bit u will spend long days staring at your stupid 
machine wondering how could i get in , and u wont 
figure it out , so get the other -leet- asses 
copts and u guyz figure it out together.
be happy , u have a clean HDs now.. plenty of 
free space !, ayy khedma :0)
p/s stop your mean way of insulting islam/muslims 
in your sites ... most of you grow up in muslim 
neighborhoods , i don't think they were as 
assholes to you as your are now , so have some
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respect to yourselves and to the others ... its 
just a thought.
cheeeeers to baasseem"
The text is revealing in a number of ways. Besides the
obvious misspellings, swearing, and juvenile insults, it
reveals a narrow-minded commitment to the defense of a
cause - in this case, the defense of Muslims. Furthermore,
although the attack and its rhetoric showed a focus on its
target, the resulting text indicates the lack of
sophistication such an attack requires.
USG was preceded by a number of like-minded groups,
all leaving their own trail of virtual graffiti. Muslim
Hacker's Club (MHC), mentioned above in the viral section,
performed 28 defacements during November and December 2001 
against mostly Indian targets.100 These attacks came at a 
time when the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir was
devolving into violence; twelve died in December when the 
Indian parliament was attacked by a group of terrorists.101
Another group, the World's Fantabulous Defacers (WFD),
has led more high profile attacks. For example, the WFD
led an attack on Ariel Sharon's election website a week
before the 2001 Israeli election that elevated Sharon to
Prime Minister. The initial reaction from the press
attributed the attack to HAMAS, indicating the potential
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link to terrorist groups.102 In its place, the group left 
graphic photos and text that accused Sharon of being a war
criminal. At the same time, it left a message expressing
the attackers' solidarity with Hezbollah and other fighters 
in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia.103
In a number of texts, Dr. Denning has asserted that
this kind of behavior is "hacktivism," or hacking for an
activist cause, and not cyberterrorism. Her justification
is that the attacks do not result in violence, "severe 
economic hardship or sustained loss of power or water."104 
This paper disagrees with her assessment. Instead, it
posits that while such activity is, indeed hacktivism, it
bleeds into the terrorism category when the actions are in
support of terrorism or terrorist causes, as is the case
with MHC and WFD.
The potential effects of these attacks, especially
when coupled with more sophistication, could be
devastating. Instead of completely defacing the website, a
potential cyberterrorist could replace the contents more
subtly. For example, one of the many attacks on the
Recording Industry of America's (RIAA) website left the
site a parody of its former self. Angered by the RIAA's
crackdown on music piracy, the hacker replaced several of
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its headlines with titles such as "Piracy can be beneficial
to the music industry" and "Are there subscription music 
services up and running?"105 Similar attacks, especially if
timed to reflect real-world events like the WFD-Sharon
defacement, could spark the political change the attackers
seek. On the other hand, if conducted in conjunction with
DoS, real-world or other attacks, such defacements could
set the tone of the information reported in a time of
crisis.
Conclusion
The three means of attack explored above - flooding,
viral, and defacement - are by no means representative of
all the virtual attacks available to the would-be
cyberterrorist. Prominently missing are classical hacking
alternatives and goals, like intrusions into classified
systems. As a December 2001 attack on servers of the U.S.
General Accounting Office by members of the "Al-Qaeda
Muslim Alliance" shows, such attacks do occur, and can be 
traced to terrorist-sympathizing hacker groups.106 Such 
methods only augment the attacks discussed here.
These methods, and their supporting precedents, point 
to a growing trend toward increased activity on the part of
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hackers supporting terrorist groups. Moreover, the tools
that facilitate most of these attacks are both easy to use
and readily available. As a result, the prevalence of this
illegal behavior will undoubtedly continue to rise.
Furthermore, world events, including major conflicts like
the one between Israel and Palestine, will probably
continue to cause spikes in activity. When coupled with
anger over world events, the availability and ease of the
tools required for these attacks often serve to enfranchise
a class of people whose voices often get lost in the
shuffle of life.
Moreover, actively participating in the ideology in
this manner can reinforce its tenets. Since many of these
hackers presumably - no studies on cyberterrorist
demographics currently exist - are not on the front lines
of the cause with a bomb and a gun, stories of the
activities of their ideological brethren can acquire a
heroic tenor. This provides a fruitful recruiting ground
for terrorist organizations looking to diversify their
activity.
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CHAPTER THREE
THREATS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
When Dorothy Denning,107 Scott Berinato,108 Bruce 
Schneier,109 and other scholars, journalists, and security 
experts claim that there is little to no risk from
cyberterrorism, they draw their conclusions from the lack
of a risk they see emanating from critical infrastructure.
Their skepticism, though, is countered by the results of
numerous hearings, presidential directives, and at least
one breach of security.
The skeptics have a variety of points. Schneier does
not believe that the general hacker ethic is not compatible
with terrorist ideology; he also claims that it will be
difficult for cyberterrorists to know which attack
strategies will have the greatest impact.110 Through 
interviews with security representatives from the critical
infrastructure industry, Berinato attempts to show that the
threat of cyberterrorism has been neutralized through 
effective security measures.111 Denning articulates that 
although the threat from cyberterrorism is emerging, it is 
currently not viable.112 These arguments have been 
augmented by others who claim that the cyberterrorism
44
threat has been overstated and overhyped by a mass media
eager for a sound bite and security experts trying to 
increase their business.113 No one, they assert, has ever 
been killed by a cyberterrorist attack.114
Indeed, many of these arguments carry salience. The
youth of cyberterrorism scholarly research and the general
neglect of the trend by traditional terrorist experts have
allowed the debate on the topic to be dominated by the
media and security experts. As Mark Pollitt wrote in a
paper for FBI Laboratory, cyberterrorism incorporates two
areas that people traditionally do not understand:
terrorism and information technology.115 As such, it is 
easy for the media and security establishments to take
advantage of the situation. In fact, a study on mass
media's coverage of cyberterrorism found that it was often
based on reports from earlier articles "with already
obscure sources;" employ a "sensationalist tone," including
the "spectacularly dominat[ing]" "use of negative words and
references to the magnitude of possible adverse actions;"
and legitimize their assertions through "official sources" 
or security experts.116 On the other hand, a significant 
number of the experts testifying at a 2002 House of
Representatives hearing on cyberterrorism were private
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security specialists.117 Such access to official debate 
allows private industry to set the tone of a debate from
which they could profit.
Hyper-exaggeration does not negate the threat,
however. Neglecting the threat of cyberterrorism on
critical infrastructure could become the catalyst that
enables an attack to succeed. Although predicting the
course or success of an attack is a difficult endeavor,
this activity can be an important factor in protecting
critical infrastructure. Several recent incidents have
shown that modern infrastructures may not be as prepared
against cyber-attacks as the optimists would like to think.
The first came in 1997. Conducted over four days in
June 1997, Eligible Receiver was an exercise mandated by
the Joint Chief of Staff to target government websites
using readily available products. Unclassified computers
from the National Military Command Center, the Pentagon,
U.S. Pacific Command, and many others were compromised, and
the attackers were able to deny services, change
information, and manage computer account information.118 
Some reports have claimed that participants in the exercise
were able to gain access to the nation's power grid and 
simulated'shutting down major portions of it.119 The
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Department of Defense confirmed that the nation's power
systems had indeed been compromised by Eligible Receiver,
but refused to detail the extent of the potential damage it 
could have caused.120 The head of the Pentagon's Joint Task 
Force on Computer Network Defense said that the operation
"clearly demonstrated [the] lack of preparation for a
coordinated cyber and physical attack on [the nation's] 
critical military and civilian infrastructure."121
Subsequent attacks or exercises on U.S. infrastructure
or military systems have attempted to take advantage of
this vulnerability. In 1998, for example, as the United
States was preparing for possible military operations
against Iraq, several Department of Defense computers were
compromised (through a known and resolvable vulnerability
in the Solaris operating system) in a coordinated attack 
known as "Solar Sunrise."122 Once the computers were 
compromised, the attackers explored the system, left
tracking software to gather information, and returned later 
to retrieve their results.123 The sources of the attacks, 
which appeared to emanate from the United Arab Emirates,
raised further concern. In the end, though, no political
motivations were found - the systems were compromised by an 
Israeli hacker and two California teenagers.124.
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Nonetheless, the attacks proved the limitations of the U.S.
government's cybersecurity, which could be just as easily
compromised by a group or individual with political
motivations.
Similarly, the 2002 Blue Cascades exercise, which
incorporated several Canadian and Pacific Northwest power
and other infrastructure companies as well as federal and
state agencies, explored the results of a potential
cyberterrorist attack or physical disaster.125 It found 
that the involved parties generally had "at best a surface-
level understanding" of the threat, including "little
recognition of the overwhelming dependency upon IT-related 
resources" for business operation and disaster recovery.126 
Furthermore, there were little to no inter-agency or inter­
governmental reporting system, public information channels,
or evidence preservation strategies. The result was a
system ripe for exploitation by a cyberterrorist attack.
By neglecting the "human factor" of public information, the
infrastructure outages of the disaster could spur mass 
panic and lead the public to believe the worst rumors.127
The 14 August 2003 power outage in the Northeastern
United States provides another interesting illustration.
Although the blackout was rooted in irresponsible overloads
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in the system,128 not terrorism, the initial reaction forced 
U.S. President Bush to quickly release a statement assuring 
the public that it "was not the work of terrorists."129 It 
proved several vulnerabilities that terrorists can exploit,
however: the potential disaster when businesses in charge
of public utilities do not adhere to government
regulations,130 the interconnected nature of regional 
infrastructures can lead to wide-ranging cuts in service,131 
and the intrinsic role information technology plays in
critical infrastructure.132
Despite all these exercises and attacks, only one
successful incident of hacking a nation's infrastructure
has been proven. Nevertheless, the case shows some
important vulnerabilities.
In March, 2001, an Australian hacker was convicted of
an earlier attack against his former employer, an
Australian sewer company. After being passed over for a
promotion, the hacker broke into the computer systems that
controlled the sewage storage tanks and instructed them to 
release their contents into the public waterways.133 Albeit 
not a terrorist incident, it shows the potential threat
employees pose. Since terrorists are not limited in their
location or employment, they can instigate cyberterrorist
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attacks on critical infrastructure through the inside
knowledge of an employee sympathetic to their cause.
Al-Muhajiroun provides an illustration of this. The
London based Islamic group "swear[s] allegiance to Osama
bin Laden and his goal of toppling Western democracies to 
establish an Islamic superstate under Shariah [sic] law."134 
In a May 5, 2004 Press Release on the organization's
website, the group highlighted a demonstration they
organized that rejected democracy in favor of a Shari'ah
state and called for U.S. President Bush and U.K. Prime
Minister Blair to be tried under a Shari'ah court.135 The
last bullet in their Vision Statement is the
"establish[ment] of Al-Khilafah in order that Islam
dominates the World (Izhaar ud-Deen) and becomes the World
order [sic] . "13S
Reliable sources confirmed in 2002 that individuals
living in the United Kingdom and employed in the British
government's telecommunications sector have expressed their
support for extremist fighters such as those in Chechnya
and Afghanistan. At least one of these sympathizers held a 
degree in computer science from a British university.137 
Although there is no confirmation that any of these
individuals are interested in disrupting Britain's
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telecommunications systems or providing others with the
expertise to do so, their proximity to crucial information
systems provides them the opportunity.
Likewise, it is not a huge stretch to subsume that
similar individuals hold similar positions in the utility
corporations of America's infrastructure. Essentially, if
individuals connected to terrorists can allegedly enter 
America's prison system as chaplains,138 what would stop 
them from finding key positions in private infrastructure
providers? This is certainly not without precedent.
Japan's Aum Shinrikyo excelled at bribing public officials
to gain access to public buildings, even after their deadly 
attack on Tokyo's subways.139 Similarly, the Church of 
Scientology's (which is obviously not a terrorist
organization) successful infiltration of the U.S. legal
system while under investigation shows that such actions 
are not necessarily fruitless.140 Consequently, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that Al Qaeda may attempt the same.
Al-Qaeda itself has shown an interest in critical
infrastructure. In 2001, city officials in Mountain View,
California - located in the heart of Silicon Valley, the
nation's technology hub - noticed increased website traffic
from Middle Eastern countries. Particularly, the webmaster
51
noticed that several revealing documents pertaining to the
city's standards vis-a-vis its police, fire, and utility 
sectors had been downloaded.141 More menacing, a January
2002 National Infrastructure Protection Center Information
Bulletin reported that:
A computer that belonged to an individual with 
indirect links to Osama bin Ladin contained 
structural architecture computer programs that 
suggested the individual was interested in 
structural engineering as it related to dams and 
other water-retaining structures. ... In 
addition, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies have received indications that Al-Qa'ida 
members have sought information on Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems 
available on multiple SCADA-related web sites.142
This computer, among others, was discovered in a house in
Pakistan that was reportedly "devoted solely" to
cyberterrorism training.143
SCADA offers a unique opportunity for the cyber­
terrorist interested in critical infrastructure. SCADA
networks provide remote access for control and data
acquisition of a variety of infrastructure control
equipment, from water pumps to traffic signals.144 These 
are the networks that, according to Berinato, can be 
controlled remotely in only limited ways.145 Nonetheless, 
limited access can still be exploited.
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In general, the nation's critical infrastructure poses
a number of opportunities to the potential cyberterrorist.
Erbschloe identifies 51 key areas that cyberterrorists may
find to be attractive targets. Prominent among these are
electric, gas and water systems; aircraft operations;
telecommunications infrastructure, including radio and
television networks and distribution systems;
transportation systems; and a number of others.146 Moreover, 
a recent analysis of wireless communication networks, which
have been uses to control such systems as railroad
crossings, found a glaring security flaw. Requiring
equipment found in any computer hardware store for less
than 1001 dollars, exploitation of the security gap can lead
to a complete jamming of the frequencies used by the 
wireless network.147 Once discovered, the news of such
flaws often propagates quickly; the necessary patches to
negate their effects often cannot be implemented at the
same dispersion rate.
A compromise in infrastructure control systems such as
these, especially when controlled by remote access systems
like SCADA, can enable the shutdown of water, power, and
other utility systems. Their interconnected nature allows
this to effect a broad segment of society, and spreads the
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effect through the entire region. Moreover, this form of
cyberterrorism can increase the hysteria that can accompany
a traditional terrorist attack. Therefore, whether
conducted via internal sources or solely from external
break-ins, the cyberterrorist threat to critical
infrastructure remains overwhelming; nonetheless, it is
probably not as apocalyptic as the sensationalist
descriptions prevalent in the media assert.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTERNET AS A COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE
The Internet has sparked a new communications era.
Family members can use its faculties to communicate,
virtually free of charge, across the world over chat
networks. Multinational corporations can remain in
constant contact with their farthest flung offices through
e-mail.. The disaffected can raise awareness of their
plight via a simple webpage.
These uses of new technology are valid, and are
employed with a positive intent. That does not mean,
however, that every human being with access to modern
technology will approach its use without any sense of
nefariousness. Indeed, terrorists can use the
communications resources of the Information Age to promote
their cause and activities. Chat rooms and websites are
especially viable means to promote awareness of terrorist
causes; in the hands of a marketing mind, they can attract
otherwise unreachable new recruits. At the same time, the
anonymity of chat rooms and e-mail, especially when coupled 
with obscuring methods like encryption and steganography,
can facilitate the planning of a terrorist attack.
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This chapter addresses this issue through the
exploration of these technologies. First, it will provide
examples of who is online, and what has been done to limit
the effect of Internet-based terrorism. Although the depth
of the Internet does not allow for truly authoritative
statistics, a few examples can indicate the dangers this
phenomenon presents. The paper will then present a case
study of steganography, a method used to obscure data that
many fear Internet-based terrorists could exploit.
The growing ubiquity of the Internet provides a
fertile recruiting ground and communications channel for
the politically motivated of any vein. Scholarly research
can not only recognize the threat this poses, it can and
should offer solutions to contain it.
Online Terror Groups
Almost all ideologies, from extremist Islamic groups
to far right hate groups, have established themselves
online. They have accomplished this via both concerted and
individual methods. Creating a website, for example, to
represent a particular terrorist organization would be a
concerted undertaking, whereas an individual website that
echoed the same rhetoric would have been established by
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individual efforts. Either way, the effect is often the
same: the political message of the terrorist group is
spread.
The effectiveness of these tactics is facilitated by
the organizational structure of the organization. Terror
groups that operate under a loosely knit organizational
scheme (as opposed to a strict, hierarchical one) are often
more able to take advantage of these technologies.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt described this phenomenon as netwar.
Essentially, netwar is the "use of networked forms of
organization, doctrine, strategy and technology attuned to 
the Information Age."148 It is the adaptation of advanced 
computer networking structures wherein no single leader or
communication path dictates the campaign or specifics of
individual actions. Often, those involved are "dispersed
organizations, small groups, and individuals" who can be 
separated geographically, culturally, or otherwise.149
In essence, the Internet and other telecommunications
technology bring people with a similar mindset yet diverse
locations to the same discussion and then empower them to
take an active role in furthering the cause.
Correspondingly, at least one study on persuasion has shown
that the typical message on many far right-wing message
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boards and websites is extraordinarily effective in
reinforcing a pre-existing ideology.150 It is even more 
powerful if the end-user is able to directly interact with
his peers. The result is that an "inverse relationship"
develops between a public's access to modern technology and 
its government's ability to exert control.151
Consequently, Louis Beam, a leader of the American far 
right, calls this phenomenon "leaderless resistance."152 
The hate groups of the far right, both in the United States
and abroad, have been especially adept at adapting to new
technology. In 1984, Beam created one of the first hate-
centered online Bulletin Board System (BBS). In it, like­
minded individuals could gather to discuss issues pertinent
to the BBS' "'pro-American, pro-white, anti-Communist" 
theme.153 The advent of the Internet merely enabled hate 
groups to spread their message; when it was confined to
BBS', the message base was limited by the technical
capacity of the BBS' equipment, specifically by the amount
of dial-up lines on which users can connect to the system.
The Internet's decentralized framework has no such
limitations. As a result, the number of Internet outlets
for hate groups has exploded. The newest edition of a
compendium of hate groups, for example, lists 113 pages of
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websites, chat groups, newsgroups, mailing lists and other 
outlets that have emerged online.154
Of course, the harboring of hatred against another
group does not make someone a terrorist. In fact, a public
debate still rages as to the necessity of differentiating
between hate crimes and more traditional incidents.155
Discussion of hate groups is included, however, because the
"us versus them" mentality that develops among their
denizens is reflected in the rhetoric of millennial
terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden's
rhetoric, for example, has often illustrated this trend.
Bin Laden routinely elevates the role of American power
until America becomes a "mythic monster" that "only divine 
power can subdue."156 This effectively marginalizes any 
role of compromise and polarizes supporters. Moreover, the
rhetoric can have a powerful effect on an impressionable
viewer - like a curious website visitor.
Authors of extremist Islamic websites have adopted
much of this language. In fact, many have been
particularly adept in using the rhetoric as a marketing
tool. In a telling case, a Saudi born graduate student
residing in Idaho is, at the time of writing, currently
under trial for creating a website that allegedly promoted
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Islamic extremism.157 Similarly, the example of Azzam.com 
provides a particularly telling illustration of this trend.
At the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks,
Azzam.com had already served as a mouthpiece for extremist
Islamic groups for several years. Run by London-based
Azzam Publications, the website claimed to be little more
than a "media organization providing authentic news and
information about Jihad and the Foreign Mujahideen
everywhere."158 The website sold a variety of books, CD- 
ROMS, and audio and video tapes on the subject. Many, such
as the "Stories of Foreign Mujahideen killed in Bosnia"
series, glorified the tales of mujahideen (loosely
translated to be freedom fighters) fighting in various 
conflicts involving Muslims, from Chechnya to Kashmir.159
As part of their reporting on these Conflicts,
Azzam.com also promoted tales of the mujahideen on their
website. These narratives, often replete with obvious
hyperbole, glorified the efforts of the fighters
highlighted. From a text eulogizing Saudi-born Abu Thabit
Ad-Daheishi:
i
I still remember the day you approached me, 
venting your anger about the withdrawal of the 
Mujahideen ahead of a Serb flanking manoeuvre in 
Kosovo; you were angry and stressed that Jihad 
demands steadfastness and sacrifice. I told
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myself, such words would only come from a man of 
courage who would never withdraw from the face of 
danger.
You made your way through the fields of 
sacrifice, from Afghanistan to Bangladesh, to 
Albania to Chechnya. You sought the glory of 
martyrdom, and we ask Allah to grant martyrdom to 
your noble spirit. Those who knew of Abu Thabit 
would ask if he was still alive, for in him they 
all had seen the signs of a martyr, and all knew 
of his eagerness to fight and die for Allah...
Two weeks before you met your Creator, Sheikh Abu 
Umar had a vision of you; in his dream he saw you 
digging your grave with your own hands; Sheikh 
Abu Umar interpreted this as the inevitability of 
your martyrdom, so did another of your brothers 
who had the same vision. ... During the
preparations for the assault, Abu Thabit raised 
his hands in supplication to Allah. As he prayed 
to his Lord, a missile exploded between Abu 
Thabit and a brother Mujahid, Abdus-Samad of 
Tajikistan, killing both of them.160
This language mirrors bin Laden's. By promoting the
warrior role of the fighters, it glosses over details in
the ideology or the fighter's actions - like fighting in
the first place - that a reader might find questionable.
Furthermore, it conveys to the reader that they could gain
a sense of empowerment by volunteering for the cause. This
helps overcome the sense of frustration and
disenfranchisement that characterizes many terrorists and
their recruits.161 Terrorists themselves are often either
"alienated from society" and/or "have a grievance or regard 
themselves as victims of injustice."162 Often, they are
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most loyal to each other;163 websites that cater to them 
consequently help these individuals find others like
themselves. The contact often serves to reinforce the
sense of injustice.
Azzam.corn's story is particularly interesting. In
July, 2002, USA Today journalist Jack Kelley reported that
the website was being used as a communications device by Al
Qaeda members planning their next move. Messages between
terrorists, he claimed, were hidden in Azzam.corn's images
through a process known as steganography (steganography
will be examined in the next section). Although the
reliability of the story was later thrown into doubt when
Kelley was proven to be a chronic fabricator and
plagiarist,164 the story resounded in several circles. 
Politechbot.com, an online privacy website, challenged its 
readers to try to determine the veracity of the story.165 
They found several images that could contain hidden
messages, although the messages themselves were not
discerned.166
Azzam.com drew attention from other sources, however.
In particular, Jonathon Galt, a private citizen from the
United Kingdom, pressured the company hosting Azzam.com to
remove the questionable content. In order to elicit a
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response, Mr. Galt sent the hosting company an e-mail
detailing the technical justification for his suspicions
and simultaneously threatened to take his claims to the
media and the U.S. government. He then posted his
correspondence on his website.167 From that point,
Azzam.com moved servers several times, including to
entirely different domains like waaqiah.com.168 Eventually, 
its owners gave up and closed the site down in a letter
that reiterated and highlighted the polarized mentality of
their rhetoric.169
Azzam's closure and Mr. Galt's efforts did not take
place in a vacuum; other websites and vigilantes replaced
them. Whereas the number of extremist Islamic websites
(most of whose content remains in Arabic) has increased, a
majority of the pressure exerted upon extremist Islamic or
terrorist websites emanated from one group: Internet
Haganah (IH, originally introduced in Chapter Two).
The website, owned by American Aaron Weisburd,
I
routinely searches for websites that are either linked to
extremist Islamic groups or promote Islamic extremism.
Weisburd then posts a digital snapshot of the site, along
with the technical information for the site and the contact
information for the hosting company, on the IH site. A 2
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May 2004 snapshot of the Internet Haganah website points to
several sites Weisburd claim are connected to HAMAS or
Palestinian Islamic Jihad or espouse extremist Islamic
rhetoric.170 Most of the websites to which Weisburd links
are written in Arabic, so their content cannot be verified
by this author, but Weisburd professes that he only targets
websites that espouse extremist rhetoric or are directly
linked to a terrorist organization. When asked how he
makes the distinction, Weisburd responded:
"An 'Islamic' website that provides, for example, 
support, encouragement or justifications for 
political violence would be an extremist site.
An Islamic website that does not promote such 
violence is not extremist. In practice, this is 
easy. Osama Bin Laden [OBL] is not exactly the 
Prince of Peace. When someone presents OBL as a 
Great Man, they have gone over a line that should 
not be gone over."171
By posting all the relevant information for each site
online, Weisburd is effectively calling upon his readers to
assist him in contacting the hosting companies, even though 
he works closely with only a small group of individuals.172 
By distributing the effort thusly, the effectiveness of
each individual website struggle is raised. In effect,
Weisburd uses many of the same practices of online
terrorists and Islamic extremists to target them: he uses
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his website to promote his cause and simultaneously
empowers his readers to take matters into their own hands.
This is not the only similarity. The intensity of the
rhetoric Weisburd - and, much more magnified, many of the
sites he approvingly links to - uses about Islamic
extremism is itself often extreme, or at the very least,
misrepresentative. As an illustration, IH provides several
links to danielpipes.org, the website of a prominent, but
controversial173 commentator on Middle Eastern affairs. The
website prominently and directly links to Daniel Pipes'
essay entitled "What is Jihad!" and several of its
translations, as if endorsing the essay as'a guide for
understanding jihad-based movements.
Pipes' essay runs into theological problems because it
ignores the mainstream Islamic perspective of the question,
focusing instead on extremist justifications. Translated
literally, the term "jihad" means "struggle." In
mainstream Islamic discourse, the term has two forms, the
greater and lesser jihad. The greater jihad describes each
Muslim's inner struggle to find God; the lesser jihad is 
the defense of Islam against its enemies.174 Pipes' essay 
ascribes the greater jihad simply to mysticism so as to
focus on the lesser jihad. He then exploits the definition
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of the lesser jihad, twisting it from a defensive to an
offensive term and justifying its translation to "holy
T j-, z/175war.
Another site to which Weisburd links often exhibits
schoolyard characteristics. A typical day's lead news 
stories cried "antisemitic [sic]"176 over some of Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah's statements, called a convicted 
terrorist a "murderbot, "177 and implied that Islam was a 
"religion of RPGs."178 Commentators on the website's 
discussion board claimed Muslim protestors were part of a 
"backward, Arab nazi movement [sic]"179 and hoped that one, 
presumably an "Islamozoid"180 would "have an AK pointed in 
that gaping sewer-hole of his in the near future."181
These issues are brought up not to discredit
Weisburd's work, or attribute the prejudices of others to
him. Weisburd systematically points out each new iteration
of websites linked to HAMAS and other terrorist
organizations; in fact, he believes that their organization
and funding allow them to reappear more often than others.
In so doing, he provides an invaluable service to the law
enforcement community. Additionally, Weisburd has said
that he takes pains to refrain from labeling the
proprietors of any individual as 'terrorist,' instead
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presenting the reader with information on the website and
its contents. In this manner, he leaves judgment to the
reader.182
Instead, this issue has been raised to highlight the
prevalence of the polarization that can thrive in such
emotive, politically oriented online communities, where one
can 'speak' in an anonymous arena without immediate
retribution and have prejudicial speech reinforced and
cheered instead of castigated and discredited. The tone of
such speech can quickly characterize the normal mode of
communication. Doubtless, similar comments and situations
are as proliferate on many of the websites to which
Weisburd links, although language barriers, as mentioned
before, pose a limitation to this study.
No matter what 'side,' though, the standardization of
this type of rhetoric and misinformation - in the case of
the jihad essay - serves only to demonize the other in such
a manner that it becomes a monolithic enemy. Even if not
directly linked to violence, it perpetuates the hostile
emotions of those involved. Furthermore, since the public
nature of these sites, terrorist or otherwise, turns them
into propaganda outlets, it disseminates that hostility
into the rest of the Internet, and into society itself.
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Steganography: A Case Study183 
Encryption is the process of changing the visible
appearance of a message in such a way that an observer
cannot understand it. Encryption is obvious. It puts a
lock on the data that the encryptor expects that only the
recipient of the message will be able to unlock. It is
easy to discern an encrypted message from an unencrypted
one, because, as a rule, an encrypted message appears as
nothing more than random garble. Once the lock is put on,
a key is required to view the unencrypted message. Of
course, that lock can be picked, and breaking encryption
has become a cottage industry of its own.
In an encrypted message, however, the existence of the
message■itself is known to the intercepting party.
Steganography is essentially an attempt to halt this by
concealing the message in some other medium. The idea is
not new. Ancient Greeks used wax covered tablets to conceal
messages: once the message was written, the tablet would be
sealed in wax and then transported to its destination with 
the appearance of a clean slate.184 Other innovative 
approaches appeared over time. The Nazis developed an
approach in World War II called micro-dots - dots of ink
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the size of a period that contained a shrunken message. 
Invisible inks were also prevalent during the period.185
Steganography does not have to be so complex. A
previously determined steganographic method could, for
example, hide a message in the first letter of each word; a
phrase could mean something else entirely; or the
appearance of the cover message itself (for example, the
shape of the loop of a hand-written letter '1') could
contain'hidden meaning. The problem with all of these
approaches, however, is that they can only be deemed secure
until their use is discovered. In1the interest of complete
security, then, a new steganographic method has to be
devised for each subsequent message.
With the rise of computing technology, this is no
longer as necessary. Although Jackson contends that there 
is a constant "technological treadmill"185 being run by 
those who want to hide data and those who want to find it;
in practicality, the cycle is not as rigid as the one time
system described above. It is not that technology cannot
keep up: in reality, it can. However, the sheer enormity
of the medium available (the entire Internet itself), along 
with the margin of error in message discovery tools, can
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seem to give anyone trying to hide a message a tactical
edge.
Steganography in the computer age, then, has become
the art,of hiding messages inside media files, especially
image and audio files. The message being hidden is called
an embedded message. The medium hiding the message is
called a cover carrier or cover medium. (In this study,
the two terms are used interchangeably.) The resulting
message is a stego-message. There are several pieces of
software available to assist in this. One website lists 41
different programs for Windows alone, 31 of which are 
completely free.187 Three of these were chosen for research 
for this study based on availability, features, reputation
and the‘nature of the program's steganographic and
cryptographic algorithms. The only common factor was
price: due to budget constraints, only software as freeware
was used. Due to their vast availability, though, this
would do little to limit the variety of the survey. In
addition, it must be stressed that this is only a survey.
This section does not endeavor to complete a comprehensive
view of steganography; rather, it is an attempt to
determine what a security response to the threat posed by
steganography should be. As such, the demonstrations
7 0
contained in the next few pages are simply that:
demonstrations.
'Regardless of the nature of the discussion, only
programs that divulged the nature of the algorithms used
were selected. Fortunately, this does not limit as many
programs as it would seem: approaches to hiding information
in the most popular formats are generally well documented
(discussions of the formats used for this paper can be
found below), so it actually becomes more difficult to find
software that does not fit into any of these simple
paradigms.
A program's reputation was determined by entering the 
name into the Google188 search engine. Google reports the 
number of matching web sites, or hits. This paradigm was
chosen because of the ranking system Google uses determines
a site's credibility by examining the number and quality of
sites linked to it. Proceeding on the assumption that 
"links are the currency of the web,"189 the most popular and 
most credible search criteria will then return the highest
number of results, or hits. Programs of various hit counts
were considered and included in this survey.
The features category was quite broad. Under
consideration were the file types used as the cover
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carrier, the type of message allowed, the ease of use, and
the quality of encryption. Cover carriers included various
image file formats, specifically JPG, GIF and BMP; and the
audio format MP3. Software was also found that placed the
message at the end of any file. The types of messages
allowed followed similar lines; they included all the image
types listed above, simple text messages, and the ability
to include the contents of any file. Ease of use was
determined by screenshots and other material (directions,
feature lists, help files) found on the source websites.
Most programs listed their encryption method on the source
website as well. The decision making process was
influenced by the same variable as the other categories;
variety being the key point of contention.
The final consideration before undertaking this
research was the carrier cover on which the embedded
message would be transmitted. A decision was made early on
to only use images files; since the results would be
presented in a paper format, it was determined that audio
files would be too complicated or technical to present in
an understandable fashion. The image was chosen from stock 
photos available on the Internet.190 It was downloaded in 
the Jpeg format, which was converted to bmp and gif.
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Before the conversion was attempted, though, steganalysis
was performed on the image (using the technique discussed
below) in order to protect against the ironic instance of
an image that is already a stego-image. As a further
safeguard, the image was resized from 1152 x 830 pixels to
864 x 623 with MS Paint (included in MS Windows).
The first software tested was Hide & Seek. DOS-only,
it is a relic from another age. The intended cover carrier
must be a gif file; embedded messages must be plaintext.
It allows for encryption, but the version downloaded for
this paper did not come with the encryption package. A
Google search for Hide & Seek was technically implausible
because of the common name: over 14,000 hits were returned,
and judging by the first page, few had anything to do with
steganography.
Use of the program was simple. It asks for the cover
medium, the embedded message, and the stegokey. A button
allows one to "hide" the text file; another allows one to
"seek" it. The results were unimpressive. The gif file
was already grainy from its conversion, but the resulting
image had an even more grainy appearance. On top of this,
the image was resized to 1024 x 768 pixels. However, the
image was not stretched to match the new size; instead, a
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black matte was placed on the bottom and right sides. It
would appear that most of the message was placed in this
section of the image since the area is filled with tiny red
specks. The file size increase was rather small, from 312
kilobytes (KB) to 351 KB, but it was greater than the text
file size (12 KB). The beginning and resulting images can
be found in Appendix B.
Jsteg Shell, a Windows program, was chosen because of
the relatively high hit count returned by Google. At 576,
it was the highest of any non-commercial program checked
against the search engine. This program was fairly
impressive. Selection of the cover medium and embedded
message were done through a "wizard:" a step-by-step, user-
friendly system. It tells the user the amount of space
available for the embedded message, and will warn the user
if the selected file is too large. It can hide files of
any type, so the embedded message could just as easily be
an executable file as a plaintext message. Once hidden,
the resulting image appeared to be a reflection of the
starting image even though it hid an 11 KB document at the
expense of only a single kilobyte. Both images can be
found in Appendix B.
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The final program selected for this survey was
Camouflage. Camouflage integrates into Windows, showing up
when a user right clicks on a file. A wizard gently guides
the user through the process of hiding the embedded
message. Camouflage is unique because it allows any file
to be hidden in any other file. Unfortunately, that
adaptability comes at a cost. Its steganographic technique
does not obscure the message in the cover carrier; rather,
it places the'message at the end of the cover. All files
have an end of file character that tells the computer when
to stop reading. Camouflage merely places the message
after this character. Detection, therefore, is fairly
straightforward; a search for files with this anomalous
pattern - and this search is quite common in virus-
detection tools - is all that is really necessary.
Actually, detection (more legitimately referred to as
steganalysis) of any of these programs is rather
unremarkable. There are several common, well-documented
approaches to steganography, and traditional steganalysis
simply looks for the tell-tale patterns of each. Both Hide
& Seek and Jsteg are grandfathers of the genre; the
'readme' file of Hide & Seek traces versions back to 1996;
Jsteg, 1998. The patterns of each, therefore, are widely
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disseminated. Jsteg even includes a concise description of 
the steganographic algorithm used.191 This paper will 
examine the method used by Hide & Seek.
Hide & Seek uses gif files, and only gif files, as the
cover medium. In the least technical terms possible, the
first part of any gif file is a 256-color palette, to which
each section (or pixel) of the image refers in order to
determine its color. The values of this color palette are
represented as integers; on a common scale, a value of 0
means black and a value of 255 means white. (This palette
starts with 0 and ends with 255.) However, this scale can
slide: it could represent 256 shades of blue, for example.
It would be inaccurate to say that only one palette is used
per file; however, for the purpose of clarity, this
representation will suffice.192 Hide & Seek simply adjusts 
the integers in these palettes so that they are each 
divisible by 4, rounding any other values as appropriate.193 
This results in a slight color shift. The white represented
by 255, for example, becomes 252: a shift of just over 1%.
One byte of the embedded message is then assigned to this
new value. Since it is uncommon to find a 'naturally
occurring' palette (naturally occurring in this instance
means an untampered image) with these characteristics,
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detection of this manipulation becomes a simple examination
of the palette.
Since it is the easiest to implement, the method used
by Hide & Seek is one of the most common. Unfortunately
for anyone trying to hide a message, that also makes it the
easiest to detect with steganalysis. Manipulation of an
integer, or any other computer-represented value, is
nothing more than a shift of the binary representation of
the integer (or other value). For example, the integer 255
is 11111111 in binary.
Before continuing, it is appropriate to explain a few
technical computer terms and methodologies. Each of the
l's above is called a bit, and its value can be either 1 or
0. Eight bits is called a byte. Characters like 'a' or
'b' are generally represented by a single byte - so,
essentially, they are transformed into integers. There are
common scales to determine the integer representation of a
character. Modern personal computers ■■use the American 
Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) chart.194 
It is important, then, to note that to a computer, 'a' is
only one integer away from 'b' - and ,the value of two
colors on a palette are only a few integers away from each
other. Even more important is the representation of these
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integers. If 11111111 represents 256, then 11111110
represents 255. 252 is 11111100 in binary.
The differences between these numbers are found in the
least significant bits (LSBs): the last bit in the byte.
The steganographic method used by Hide & Seek capitalizes
on this idea, and so do the steganalytic tools that are 
(
designed to detect use of this type of algorithm. Whenever
non-random information is saved in a file, an analysis of
the file will discover patterns in the distribution of
bits, or bit patterns. Since most pictures contain
information themselves - whether of a family portrait or a 
nuclear silo - bit patterns will emerge naturally. It is 
easy to compare the patterns of a clean image and a
steganographic image if both are readily available.
Unfortunately, in the real world, most are not, so looking
for a known steganographic signature becomes the safest
attack. StegDetect, a piece of public domain
steganalytical software written by Neil Provos, a doctoral
candidate in Computer Science at the University of
Michigan, is an example of this tactic. It searches images
for the steganographic patterns of four steganographic
programs: Jsteg, the author's own Outguess, Jphide, and the 
commercial program Invisible Secrets.195
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While this is appropriate for experimental software,
it is not conclusive enough to certify an image as message
free. A better method is to second-guess the nature of the
embedding software by basing detection methods on the
statistical search for anomalies. For example, it is easy
to estimate the distribution of colors in an image simply
by developing a histogram from the MSBs of each pixel in 
the file.195 Another histogram, this time developed by 
analyzing the full color depth of each pixel, is then
compared to the first computation. Any sufficiently large
differences between the two would point to the possibility 
of an embedded message.197 Unfortunately, testing for these 
anomalies can lead to an unnecessarily large number of
false positives. Even Provos, in a study of Internet
images with StegDetect -which, as noted above, does not use
this method - found what he concluded to be false
positives.198 Any steganalysis has to be cognizant of the 
potential for these anomalies.
The security of steganography as a means of
communication has not yet been decided by the academic
community. Many researchers have contended that the
science of steganography has not yet matured to the 
security allowed by its cousin encryption,199 although a
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level of security is added by encrypting the embedded
message before it is placed in the cover carrier. However,
the point of steganography is to communicate without the
knowledge of a third party. N.J. Hopper contends in a
September 2002 paper that he has discovered a series of 
stegonagraphic techniques that are provably secure.200 The 
science of encryption has labored under this methodology of
theorize, disprove and theorize again since its inception;
the most recent example being distributed.net's crack of 
RSA's RC5-64 encryption.201
The theories and practices of steganography are not
going away. Methodologies and techniques are widely
available on the Internet, in scholarly journals and books,
and the minds of scholars worldwide. Even if this were not
the case, the art of hiding information is not a completely
nefarious occupation. It can be vital to corporate and
private interests for the same reasons that encryption is;
namely, that people deserve the right to keep secrets
protected from unwanted eyes. In addition, steganography
can be used in the practical application of watermarking.
Copyright holders can use watermarks to protect their legal 
holdings and prevent the illegal distribution or tampering
of these works. The 'broadcast flag' that the Federal
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Communications Commission (FCC) is currently considering 
for digital television broadcasts202 is just such an 
example.
So any concerted defense against steganography should
not be so strong that it results in false positives or
intervenes in legitimate uses of the technology. There has
been discussion of taking an active approach to
steganalysis: instead of merely listening to the data river
of the Internet, random noise can be inserted into pictures 
to obscure or destroy any steganographic content.203 It has 
also been suggested that steganalysis should become "a part 
of every virus-detection software."204 While both can be 
valid bulwarks of our cyber-defense, it is the first
suggestion, which is commonly referred to as an 'active
warden,' that contains the most potential in stopping the
spread of steganographic methods on the Internet.
Unfortunately, this also raises civil libertarian issues -
an unseen government with unfettered access to all Internet
communication - that may make an unmetered implementation
of this defense hard for the public at large to accept.
The experiences of Azzam.com bring to light several
concerns - especially when they are considered in an
environment where an active warden is present. Fisk
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suggests that these wardens should be used in a firewall­
like configuration to block and reconfigure any 
steganographic messages.205 Firewalls block malicious 
hackers from gaining access to a network, and can often be
used to block certain websites and other content. Fisk's
active warden would not block any traffic, but instead add
noise to potentially steganographic traffic. This noise
would have to remain in a precarious balance: it must not
degrade image quality so much that the end user can notice
the loss of quality, but it must add enough noise that any
embedded message is destroyed. In order for this to be
effective on a national level, a series of these firewalls
must be placed on or near all of the major Internet
thoroughfares (the 'backbone' in computer terms). This
centralizes the burden of detection and elimination of
steganographic threats. Otherwise, the publisher of each
website would be responsible for keeping the contents steg
free. This is the current system. It is the shortcomings
of taking this approach that raise these concerns in the
first place.
In the case of Azzam.com, if the webmaster knew the
contents were secret al-Qaeda communications (and it was
proved that they were), and never did anything about it,
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that webmaster could be held liable under current legal 
trends.206 What about eBay.com then? eBay is a commercial 
site with no proven links to any terrorist organizations.
There are thousands of active auctions on the site at any
given time, each of which could contain a number of images.
Would it then be eBay's responsibility to ensure there are
no malicious pictures? Finally, what about the website in
the middle? This could be, for example, one with a forum
that allows users to post images in their messages. These
are often run on shoestring budgets as a hobby of the
webmaster. Would it still be the webmaster's
responsibility to remove any of these images? If so, how
would he or she obtain the resources to do so? Are we, as
a society, willing to allow the tradeoff of the loss of a
few 'hobby' websites for a supposed measure of increased
security?
These questions lead to a more centralized approach to
the problem of an active warden. So, then, what content
would be analyzed? It would be implausible for these
computers to filter every piece of a potential stego-
medium.■ Instead, it is fair to assume that a 'blacklist'
of destination sources and destinations would be identified
and constantly updated so that the traffic coming in and
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out of each would get a clean bill of health. Certainly, a
statistical approach designed to trace this information
would have to be taken because a known signature attack
would not necessarily return enough results. But who is to
decide what websites are on the blacklist? The reporting
of newspapers and websites is not sufficient evidence to
warrant the systematic tampering of a website's contents
and traffic. Finally, an argument could be made that
tampering would be an infringement on the image producer's
right to free speech. These are issues the nation will
have to deal with, especially as it adapts its laws to
reflect emerging technologies.
Conclusions
The Internet presents a new set of challenges for the
counter-terrorist officer simply because it allows for
greater communication capabilities. Essentially, the
transnational nature of the Internet and similar
technologies facilitates the global spread of organizations
such as al-Qaeda. Cell leaders (small, non-connected
groups of would-be terrorists that have reportedly been
established in most Western countries) can remain in
constant communication with their connections in al-Qaeda
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and other terrorist groups. At the same time, the Internet
remains one of the easiest and most efficient direct
recruiting and communication channels of the disaffected
and disenfranchised.
Countering these developments is often futile.
Steganalysis, for example, is akin to a search for a needle
in a haystack - only in this case, the needle has been
disguised to look and feel like any other piece of straw.
Even when the rhetoric and communications are left in the
open, they are often difficult to counter. Websites can be
established quickly and fleetingly, located in
disinterested countries or hosted by sympathetic companies,
and contain extremist rhetoric, commands, or
communications.
Moreover, many mediums, including chat rooms, are
unstable sources for the law enforcement official; the
information in chat rooms exists only for the moment at
which the conversation exists. The software that runs chat
rooms, websites, et cetera, is readily available and
relatively easy to install for anyone with the relevant
background knowledge. In these cases, terrorists can
simultaneously connect to a private, unadvertised server
for a short time, engage in their communication, and then
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never visit the server again. Obviously, the temporary
nature of these practices enables terrorist activity to
remain under the radar, throwing up a significant roadblock
against counter-terrorist efforts.
Even websites that are more permanent, like Azzam.com
or its successors, tend to regenerate. Since they are
intended more for propaganda purposes than communication,
the impetus to keep these websites alive is strong.
Whether through IH's efforts or otherwise, HAMAS's reputed
website, Palestine-Info, has been closed several times, but
that has not stopped its owners from simply moving to a
different server.
The dynamicism displayed by the tenacity of terrorists
to keep their online presence viable is symbolic of their
real-world tactics. The long-term futility and endless
nature of counter-terrorism strategy, then, calls for a
different approach. Ideology drives terrorists, keeping
the fervor to continue strong. An effective counter­
terrorism strategy, even one limited to cyberspace, cannot
focus simply on these back-and-forth tactics and ignore the
role of ideology. Chapter six offers a few such
suggestions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
GOVERNMENT REACTIONS
Western governments have not neglected the
cyberterrorism threat. Indeed, since 1998, when U.S.
President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63
(PDD-63) has, at varying levels, focused on the intricacies
of the threat. A particular theme since this time has been
the integration of the public and private sectors in
addressing vulnerabilities. This exploration of means to
counteract the threat were reinforced and addressed at more
length in the 2002 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,
the official U.S. policy paper on the matter.
The U.S. has not been alone in formulating policy and
legislation to protect cyberspace. The European Union, in
particular, created the Convention on Cybercrime in 2001 to
deal with the problems of protecting cyberspace. Although
it did not specifically deal with the threat from
cyberterrorism, it nevertheless established an inter­
governmental framework for a criminal justice question that
transcends borders. This, of course, can be problematic,
as the intergovernmental cooperation clauses could require 
one state's definition of a terrorist to trump another's.207
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Nonetheless, it moves the debate into the realm of
international law. President Bush has urged the Senate to 
ratify the treaty.208
Several other nations have established legislation or
executive action to deal with cyberterrorism. Their
numbers have mostly been limited, though, to states that
perceive it as a threat - a problem when dealing with a
security threat that can emanate from any state. In 2000,
for example, the "I Love You," or "Love Bug" virus infected
more than 1.27 million computers, forced the U.S. State
Department to temporarily disconnect from the Internet, and 
spawned several variants.209 Despite all this damage, the 
suspected author, a Filipino man living in Manila, was
never convicted because the Philippines did not have any 
laws against such actions.210
This illustration serves to underscore the importance
of international contiguity of legal codes dealing with
this issue. The E.U.'s Convention, which was signed in
2001 by 30 countries including the United States, can help
serve this purpose, since it attempts to build an
international consensus in the approach to countering
cyberterrorism.211 The remainder of this chapter, however,
will be limited to exploring the U.S. government's reaction
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to the cyberthreat, focusing particularly on the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and its criticisms.
U.S. Reactions
The U.S. government's first notable recognition of the
threat from cyberterrorism emerged from the 1997 report of
the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection. The Commission determined that cyberthreats
took several forms: an attack on specific databases or
other information repositories; one geared simply toward
gaining network access; simple espionage; shutting a
particular service or sets of services down (particularly
via Denial of Service techniques); and the "introduction of
harmful instructions" - everything from viruses to
deliberate corruptions of data.212
The report sparked the 1998 Presidential Decision
Directive 63 (PDD-63). The-document recognized seven
categories that made up critical infrastructure:
"telecommunications, energy, banking and finance,
transportation, water systems and emergency services, both 
governmental and private."213 Equally important, PDD-63 
sought a public-private partnership to determine the best
way to protect critical infrastructure, much of which was
8 9
controlled by private institutions. It conveyed the belief
that market forces should sufficiently pressure private
institutions into compliance with accepted best practices;
in so doing, the directive asserted that those charged with
protecting the nation's critical infrastructure should
"seek to avoid outcomes that increase government regulation
or expand unfunded government mandates to the private 
sector."214 This idea continued as a trend in future policy
documents.
PDD-63 called for several other changes as well. Most
prominent among these, the Directive called for the
establishment of a National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC) and an Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (ISAC).215 Three ISACs were eventually created, 
serving the Financial Services, Telecommunications and 
Information Technology sectors.216
The Information Technology ISAC (IT-ISAC) is the ISAC
most relevant to the discussion at hand. Serving as a
trade association, its membership is restricted to U.S. 
based "firm[s] or corporation [s]. "217 Despite this 
limitation, its 24 members include several top security and 
software companies like Microsoft, Symantec, and Oracle.218 
Nonetheless, significant information technology sectors,
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particularly open source representatives, are notably
absent.' As such, the alerts the Center releases are
limited to problems with software from the companies
219represented.
Part of the cause for this lies in the membership
restrictions. Most open source software is not controlled
by a specific company; instead, volunteers develop the
product. Accordingly, the software is usually free to
install, often leading to widespread use. For example,
Netcraft, a company specializing in web site statistics,
found in a May 2004 survey that 66.99% of websites
(33,329,879 total sites) currently use the open source
Apache web server. 220 IT-ISAC's exclusion of this product 
therefore limits its ability to provide an effective alert
system to the public. Furthermore, since its membership is
based in the private sector, the entire alert system is
completely voluntary. There is little impetus for firms to
not only release vulnerability alerts to the public, but
also share that information with competitors.
The NIPC, established under the FBI but now under the
Department of Homeland Security, provides weekly warnings
and emergency bulletins regarding cyberthreats. Although
it still exists in a limited form, it was merged in 2003
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with several other agencies to create the United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). US-CERT
provides Alerts, Information Bulletins, and Tips to assist
the public in their efforts to protect their computer
systems. The most recent weekly bulletin at the time of
writing, dated April 28, 2004, lists new vulnerabilities,
exploits and viruses in software systems discovered between
April 6 and April 26, 2004. The document is 70 pages in 
length.221 Obviously, this is an incredible amount of 
information for the end user to wade through. At the same
time, though, it shows the continued proliferation of
threats in cyberspace.
Released in February 2003, The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace updated the policies outlined in PDD-63.
Most importantly, it recognized that the effective defense
of cyberspace requires the cooperation and "coordinated and
focused effort" from "the federal government, state and
local governments, the private sector, and the American 
people."222 Furthermore, it recognized that the challenge 
is threefold: prevention of critical infrastructure from
cyber-based attacks, reduction in vulnerability, and the
absolute minimization of both the damage caused and the
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time required to recover.223 Finally, it recognized five 
priority areas:
"I.A National Cyberspace Security Response 
System;
II. A National Cyberspace Security Threat and
Vulnerability Reduction Program;
III. A National Cyberspace Security Awareness and 
Training Program;
IV. Securing Government's Cyberspace; and
V. National Security and International Cyberspace
Security Cooperation."224
These three aspects - society wide involvement, focal
points and priority areas - provide a useful structure for
establishing a system wide cybersecurity strategy. It
extends the public-private partnership paradigm to include
all sectors, recognizes the threats, and provides the
impetus for a centralized, system-wide information sharing
center that all Americans are aware of and use.
Unfortunately, some of the fundamental ideas built into the
structure, particularly in information dissemination and
standards compliance, limit its effectiveness.
Priority I, the Cyberspace Response System, looks to
establish a system that provides analysis and vulnerability
assessments, a warning and information network that
simultaneously provides a "synoptic view of the health of
cyberspace," and an incident management and recovery 
system.225 Priority II recommends threat deterrence and
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reduction campaigns, including new law enforcement
techniques; the concerted recognition and neutralization of
existing threats; and the greater incorporation of security
concerns into new products. Particularly, it looks to
improve both Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
Systems (SCADA) , which control critical infrastructure, and
the underlying technologies and physical components that
allow the Internet to function. It also recognizes that
the threats and vulnerabilities to cyberspace constantly 
evolve.226 The third priority seeks to establish an 
extensive awareness campaign in the country, particularly
in large enterprises and home user sectors. Its only
proposed method of addressing home users, however, is
through education at the primary, secondary, and higher
education levels; it ignores those not involved in the 
nation's education system.227
The Strategy's efforts to secure the federal
government's information system, found in the fourth
priority, are among the most thorough recommendations
offered. It addresses several components to this process,
including continued vulnerability and threat assessment,
especially on an agency specific basis; tight user
management; and special attention to ensuring that private
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contractors the government outsources projects to adopt
responsibly security strategies. State and local
governments, on the other hand, are simply directed to work
with DHS to find solutions that fit their needs.228
Finally, the last priority seeks to strengthen law
enforcement coordination on cyberspace matters between U.S.
agencies and their counterparts worldwide, assisting
countries whose capabilities in this regard are
deficient.229
The release of the Strategy was greeted with criticism
from several corners of the computer security sector. MostI
of their complaints stemmed from the fact that the document
did not actually require anything of anyone - it only made
recommendations; particularly to the private sector, whose
cooperation was completely voluntary. News.com said it 
"lacked muscle."230 On the other hand, The Center for 
Democracy and Technology, a think tank dedicated to privacy
and security issues, was concerned that the draft version
of the document did not do enough to protect online
privacy.231 Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Industries, a 
prominent security firm, had a much more long-winded, but
still important, set of criticisms:
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"This National Strategy document isn't law, and 
it doesn't contain any mandates to government 
agencies. It has lots of recommendations. It has 
all sorts of processes. It has yet another list 
of suggested best practices. ... But plans, no 
matter how detailed and how accurate they are, 
don't secure anything; action does.
And consensus doesn't secure anything.
Preliminary drafts of the plan included strong 
words about wireless insecurity, which were 
removed because the wireless industry didn't want 
to look bad for not doing anything about it. 
Preliminary drafts included a suggestion that 
ISPs provide all their users with personal 
firewalls; that was taken out because ISPs didn't 
want to look bad for not already doing something 
like that.
And so on. This is what you get with a PR 
document. You get lots of varying input from all 
sorts of special interests, and you end up with a 
document that offends no one because it demands 
nothing.
...Security is a commons. Like air and water and 
radio spectrum, any individual's use of it 
affects us all. The way to prevent people from 
abusing a commons is to regulate it. Companies 
didn't stop dumping toxic wastes into rivers 
because the government asked them nicely. 
Companies stopped because the government made it 
illegal to do so."232
Certainly, many of these, and other criticisms, 233 are 
valid. Their concerns may not have been addressed,
however, because of the difficulty of enforcement. At the
user level, public understanding and awareness of computer 
related issues remains low. Much like an automobile or any
other technological tool, many end users simply expect
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their computer to function. The inner workings of the
system do not enter into their daily life, so forcing them
to incorporate security concerns, even with the threat of
punishment, could stifle growth and/or lead to an
unnecessary overload in computer crime enforcement cases.
Mandates at the corporate level face similar
roadblocks. Should a software firm, such as Microsoft,
face a punitive response if a heretofore unforeseen
security vulnerability is discovered in their products?
Likewise, mandates could open the door for litigation, both
against software creators and a compromised organization,
which could be sued by business partners concerned by their
security policies or by customers negatively affected by
the downtime.
Finally, there is an inherent problem in trying to 
enforce legislation on an issue that constantly evolves.234 
Bureaucratic and congressional inertia often delays law­
making and enforcement activities. Due to their dynamic
nature, attention to cybersecurity issues must remain fluid
to be effective.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to find evidence of the
effectiveness of the current voluntary strategy. Although
the software of several firms was listed as compromised in
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the April 27, 2004 US-CERT Information Bulletin,235 as of 
May, 2004, IT-ISAC's alert archive had not been updated 
since January, 2004.236 Obviously, corporations are not 
voluntarily divulging information that could negatively
impact their bottom line. A compromise, then, would have
to find a path between absolute mandates and mere
encouragement.
Congress has provided a few alternatives that may be
helpful. One of the most promising of these is the Cyber
Security Research and Development Act (H.R. 3395), which
was passed by Congress in 2002. The law provides funding
for fellowships and research programs on cyber security 
research. 237 The Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, 
which comprised Section 225 of the Homeland Security Act of
the same year, addressed cyberterrorism from a law
enforcement viewpoint. It directs sentencing authorities
to account for the intentions of the attack, especially
whether or not human or public health was threatened, when 
determining a guilty cyberterrorist's punishment.238 
Congressional committees have also conducted several
hearings on cyberterrorism and the protection of critical
infrastructure systems.
98
Conclusions
U.S. policy vis-a-vis cyberterrorism is still in its
infancy. It has' not had the time required to develop into
a full-fledged policy set, especially in the prevention
area. It has, however, taken the first few steps toward
that goal, particularly in The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace's efforts to achieve ubiquitous online security
throughout all sectors.
The Strategy holds two key themes. First, an
effective counter-cyberterrorism strategy must encompass
all of society. Schneier is correct in his assertion that
online security represents a commons; this threat can be
best understood in the context of compromised agent
machines involved in a Denial of Service attack.
Similarly, the nation's Internet infrastructure is held in
private hands. Protection of that infrastructure therefore
rests primarily on those entities.
Second, the Strategy recognizes that information
sharing and dissemination will remain key to any effective
policy. This includes information collected before,
during, and after an attack, and requires the cooperation
of the public and private sector with an information
clearinghouse such as US-CERT. Information dissemination
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is ineffective, however, without a public conscientious of
both the threat and vulnerabilities they face and an
information source for solutions.
The implementation of these policies does have
problems, however. Most of these revolve around the weight
of the Strategy's recommendations, which require nothing
but voluntary cooperation of the involved sectors.
Mandating policy in such a dynamic environment is
problematic, of course, so an alternative approach needs to
be taken. As time passes, however, workarounds to this
contradiction are likely to occur. Like cyberterrorism
itself, cybersecurity is constantly evolving. Given proper
attention, public policy will undoubtedly advance with it.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
"Not long ago, we marked the 20th anniversary of 
a terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, when the 
suicide bomb truck attacked the Marine barracks. 
And that blast killed more than 240 Americans. 
Soon after that attack, President Reagan and 
Secretary of State Shultz asked me to serve as 
the Middle East envoy for a period. That 
experience taught me lessons about the nature of 
terrorism that are relevant today as we prosecute 
the global war on terror. After the attack, one 
seemingly logical response was to put a cement 
barricade around the buildings to prevent more 
truck bombings — a very logical thing to do. And 
it had the effect of preventing more truck 
bombings. But the terrorists very quickly figured 
out how to get around those barricades, and they 
began lobbing rocket-propelled grenades over the 
cement barricades. And the reaction then was to 
hunker down even more, and they started seeing 
buildings along the Cornish that runs along the 
sea in Beirut draped with metal wire mesh coming 
down from several stories high so that when 
rocket-propelled grenades hit the mesh, they 
would bounce off, doing little damage. It worked, 
again, but only briefly. And the terrorists again 
adapted. They watched the comings and goings of 
embassy personnel and began hitting soft targets. 
They killed people on their way to and from work. 
So for every defense, first barricades then wire 
mesh, the terrorists moved to another avenue of 
attack. One has to note that the terrorists had 
learned important lessons: that terrorism is a 
great equalizer, it’s a force multiplier, it’s 
cheap, it's deniable, it yields substantial 
results, it's low risk and it's often without 
penalty. They had learned that a single attack by 
influencing public opinion and morale can alter 
the behavior of great nations..."239
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Unique among the mediums by which terrorists can
attack, cyberspace is characterized by a mindset that must
constantly evolve to survive. This has been an intricate
part of cybersecurity since the first worm, the first
virus, the first hacking attempt. When combined with the
ideological fervor that drives many terrorist
organizations, this sense of perpetual adaptability grows
stronger.
This thesis has shown, albeit in abbreviated form,
several of the current and potential approaches to
cyberterrorism. This is nothing more than a snapshot of
past and present threats. A new, heretofore unforeseen
approach or attack could emerge at the blink of an eye and
spread like wildfire throughout the hacking, cracking,
hacktivist, and cyberterrorist communities. This
phenomenon becomes evident each time a new, quickly
spreading worm emerges. Upon detection, cybersecurity
experts examine the intrusive software, determine a fix,
and then, once the fires have died down a bit, attempt to
find similar vulnerabilities that could be exploited. They
do not expect their work to ever be fully completed, so
neither should a counter-cyberterrorist agent.
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Three areas of cyberterrorism have been addressed: (1)
virtual attacks upon other virtual entities; (2) virtual
attacks focused on physical critical infrastructure
systems; and (3) the use of the Internet as a
communications device. The latter is not only the most
prevalent example of cyberterrorism, but the most dangerous
as well. Even attacks on critical infrastructure, as
devastating as they could be, still are confined in scope.
Information on the Internet, on the other hand, is global.
It can be used as propaganda or to recruit new members.
Moreover, it can be employed as a communications medium
between disparate terrorist cells and their leadership.
This facilitates the global nature of modern terrorist
organizations, providing them with a greater means for
attack. Accordingly, cybersecurity experts in
counterterrorist units must be allowed to address each of
these areas in order to fulfill their duties.
There are several ways to facilitate their work. Like
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, most of these
recommendations revolve around information sharing, both on
the database and awareness fronts. An effective
implementation of these prescriptions would see them
realized, where appropriate, at all levels of an
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interconnected, global society - local, national, and
inter-governmental.
US-CERT's Information Bulletins have the potential to
efficiently distribute important information to protect the
public's online entities. They could nonetheless use some
improvement in their ability to distribute the information
they contain, however.
In addition to the Bulletins and other alerts, US-CERT
should create a searchable database of vulnerabilities and
exploits. This database should enable the end user to list
vulnerabilities by date recognized for a specific software
product. By doing so, the database will enable the user to
ensure their software is completely up to date. In fact, a
useful add-on to this database would be a piece of software
that scans a user's computer and, after connecting to the
database, presents the user with software patches and
updates that will protect their machine. In addition,
software vendors should include a link to this database and
update software in their installation program. Instead of
forcing the user to go to each software vendor for updates,
then, this centralizes and streamlines the process for the
end user and makes him or her more likely to take the steps
necessary to protect the machine.
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This idea is not without flaws, of course. Privacy
issues spring foremost to the list of criticisms, as any
government-sponsored investigation of a user's hard drive
could be misused or viewed as suspicious. Another problem
may arise from the software industry. Understandably,
companies will not want to admit that their software could
be vulnerable to security issues, as that is tantamount to
admitting an inability to create secure software. The lack
of timely alerts on IT-ISAC's websites indicates the
resistance of software companies to sharing this knowledge.
Furthermore, software vendors will probably express concern
over giving up control over their products to a third
party. Nonetheless, these issues can be expressed through
a careful and concerted campaign.
The public will also stand to benefit from a more
effective awareness campaign than the one outlined in The
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The Strategy's
campaign is limited to business and educational
institutions. Awareness programs should also target home
users, especially since the increasing prevalence of
broadband connections increases the pool of machines
available to serve as agents in a denial of service attack.
Advertising campaigns may work for this; more effective,
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though, representatives of US-CERT should make themselves
available to the media whenever an attack occurs or a major
new virus or worm hits the Internet. If the media looks to
US-CERT for guidance at such times, the public will
probably follow.
Cyberterrorism experts should also seek to create a
database that tracks cyberterrorist activity. The RAND-
MIPT Terrorism Incident database provides a useful model
for this. It allows a user to search for information on
terror attacks by group, target, weapon used, region, 
country, and city. 240 Updated regularly, the database 
should track all cyberspace attacks in which law
enforcement officials believe cyberterrorism was involved.
Moreover, it should consider a number of variables,
including the type of attack, source, tools used (and
whether they seemed to be publicly available or homegrown),
probability of repetition, and rationale for classifying it
as terrorism. Even if law enforcement officials later
rescind this categorization (which should be in the
database as well), an entry for the attack should remain so
as to facilitate a better understanding of law
enforcement's relationship to the threat. Further analysis
can determine flaws in the law enforcement system or
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legislation that can be corrected to help assist later
inquiries.
Finally, every counter-cyberterrorism effort should be
undertaken with an eye toward two facets: cooperation with
other states and inter-governmental agencies, and the
motivations behind the attacks. This comprehensive
understanding and approach will facilitate a quicker
response to the threat, and an ability to predict the
sources, methods and motivations of future attacks or
activities.
Cyberterrorism is a global problem; it requires a
global solution. Its low entry cost makes it the most
equalizing attack method or force multiplier available to
many actors. As a result, cyberterrorist threats will only
continue to grow. To protect themselves, states, along
with the scholars that research the topic, must not only
heighten their awareness of the threats, but take steps to
counter them as well. Serious problems from cyberterrorism
may not arise immediately, but they will eventually.
Without proper attention and precautionary steps taken now,
those problems will become catastrophes.
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Terms
Bit - The smallest piece of information a computer can
store. A bit can either have the value 'O' or '1.'
Byte - A string of eight bits. One byte usually stores one
character, such as a number or letter.
Critical Infrastructure - The infrastructure systems that
allow modern society to function. These include
electricity, water, transportation, and
telecommunications equipment and stations.
Cyberterrorism - A loose definition is used in this text.
Generally, it refers to online activity used to
promote the political causes of terrorists.
Cyberterrorist - An individual or group that engages in
cyberterrorism.
Denial of Service (DoS) Attack - An attempt to neutralize a
network by flooding it with unnecessary information.
Hacktivist - Hacker who uses his or her skills to further
an activist cause.
Jihad - Literally, jihad means "struggle" in Arabic. In
the context of mainstream Islamic discourse, there are
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two forms of jihad. The Greater Jihad refers to the
internal struggle between a person and God; the Lesser
Jihad is the defense of Islam.
Load anomaly - Occurs when an unusual amount of resources
are used without an apparent cause. Applies to
networks and processors.
Mujahideen - Warriors fighting to defend Islam.
Netwar - An organizational structure, especially attuned to
the Information Age and asymmetrical warfare, in which
the interconnectivity of modern technology allows for
less hierarchy and more adaptability.
Steganalysis - The process of analyzing a file to determine
if it holds a steganographic message.
Steganographic Message - A message hidden using
steganography.
Steganography - Hidden messages in Greek, steganography is
the act of hiding a message inside an innocuous
container. In the computer world, this often refers
to attempts to hide information within image files.
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Terrorism - An ill-defined term, in this text, terrorism is
motivated by political change, is often attributed to
non-state actors, and involves violence against an
individual, society, or property.
Virus - A software program designed to gain ungranted
access to a computer. Viruses often produce malicious
results, including deleted or corrupt files. They
require some form of user interaction to attack.
Worms - A worm is basically a self-replicating virus. When
connected to a network, many worms can spread across
the Internet in a matter of minutes.
Ill
Agencies
D.H.S. - Department of Homeland Security.
F.B.I. - Federal Bureau of Investigation.
IT-ISAC - Information Technology Information Sharing and
Analysis Center.
N.I.P.C. - National Infrastructure Protection Center.
US-CERT - United States Computer Emergency Response Team
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